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Who	  creates	  value	  creation?	  
Systems	  for	  measuring	  the	  value	  and	  growth	  of	  the	  
mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  (M&A)	  market	  in	  France	  since	  the	  1990’s	  
	  
Summary:	  
This	   article	   examines	   the	   unprecedented	   rise	   in	   the	   number	   of	   corporate	   transactions	   in	  
France	   since	   the	  1990’s.	   Studied	   from	  the	  point	  of	   view	  of	  economic	   sociology,	   it	   aims	   to	  
analyse	   this	   rise	   as	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   (M&A)	   market	   by	  
professionals	  who	  are	  intermediaries	  in	  this	  market,	  namely	  bankers	  and	  business	  lawyers,	  
financial	  consultants,	   investment	  funds	  and	  merchant	  bankers.	   It	  shows	  how	  these	  market	  
intermediaries	   have	   developed	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   transaction	   can	   create	   value	   by	   using	  
homogenised,	   normative	   measurement	   systems.	   These	   systems	   form	   a	   cognitive	   and	  
normative	   framework	   in	   which	   corporate	   transactions	   professionals	   think	   and	   act,	   hence	  
contributing	  towards	  commodifying	  companies	  and	  calculating	  a	  market	  price	  for	  them.	  The	  
rise	  in	  the	  number	  of	  transactions	  over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years	  can	  therefore	  be	  explained	  less	  
as	   a	   result	   of	  market	   forces,	   than	   as	   the	   product	   of	   social	   forces	   shaping	   and	  driving	   the	  
market.	   The	   article	   is	   based	   on	   a	   recent	   survey	   in	   the	  mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   sector	   in	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The	   first	  waves	   of	   privatisation	   of	   public	   companies	   (1986-­‐1988;	   1993-­‐1995)	   launched	   an	  
unprecedented	   rise	   in	   corporate	   transactions	   in	   France,	  which	  echoed	  a	  process	   that	  had	  
started	   in	   the	   US	   alongside	   deregulation	   and	   the	   transformation	   of	   financial	   capitalism	  
(Fligstein,	  1990,	  2001;	  1996	  Useem).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  and	  volume	  
of	   transactions1,	   this	   trend	   was	   characterised	   by	   the	   emergence	   of	   specialised	   actors,	  
systems	  and	  careers.	  Indeed,	  developments	  occurred	  within	  the	  banking	  sector,	  both	  in	  that	  
there	   started	   to	   appear	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	   investment	   banks	   (Goldman	   Sachs,	   etc.)	   and	   equally	  
investment	  banks	  within	  long-­‐standing	  banks	  (Société	  Générale,	  Paribas,	  etc.)	  were	  created,	  
strengthened	  or	  became	  independent.	  American	  “law	  firms”	  started	  to	  establish	  themselves	  
in	   the	   legal	   sector	  and,	  as	  a	   result,	  French	   law	  firms	  began	  to	  change	   (Dezalay	  and	  Garth,	  
1998).	   Auditing	   firms	   now	   offered	   new	   services	   related	   to	   transactions,	   alongside	   the	  
statutory	   auditing	   roles	   that	   they	   traditionally	   fulfilled.	   There	   emerged	   investment	   funds	  
specialised	   in	   buying	   (and	   selling)	   companies	   and	   the	   amount	   invested	   in	   this	   sector	  
increased	  tenfold	  between	  2001	  and	  20112.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  systems,	  there	  emerged,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  a	  new	  financial	  understanding	  of	  the	  control	  of	  companies,	  as	  expressed	  by	  the	  
notion	   of	   “shareholder	   value”	   (Fligstein	   2001;	   Lordon	   2000).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  
production	   process	   of	   transactions	   was	   industrialised	   (division	   of	   labour	   between	   actors,	  
standardisation	  of	  methods).	  Finally,	  there	  were	  new	  tools	  for	  analysing	  the	  market	  (such	  as	  
financial	   aggregates,	   ratio	   analysis,	   accounting	   standards	   and	   evaluation	   methods).	   This	  
mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  sector,	  which	  is	  known	  as	  “M&A”	  among	  professionals,	  grew	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market in France, the average number of transactions per year fluctuates. 
However, the number of transactions did increase significantly between 1990 (600) and 2000 (1952), then dropped 
back down to an average of around 1000 in 2005. By 2005, the volume in value of these transactions was 5.7 times 
what it was in 1990, reaching 101 billion dollars in 2005. Source: “Le marché du M&A en France depuis 2000” (The 
M&A market in France since 2000), Patrick Badaro, Henry Capelle, HEC-Vernimmen.net, 2005 
2 The 2001 and 2011 reports compiled by the French private equity investors association (AFIC), which combined the 
majority of private equity investments, shows the total amount invested was 1000 million euros in 1992 and 3287 in 
2001, with a peak in 2007 at 12554 million euros. 
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provided	   opportunities	   for	   new	   types	   of	   career3	   to	   graduates	   from	   the	   French	   grandes	  
écoles4.³a	  It	  progressively	  became	  a	  prestigious	  prospect	  for	  these	  graduates,	  expanding	  the	  
types	  of	  career	  in	  banks,	  audit	  or	  law,	  or	  enabling	  access	  to	  management	  positions	  or	  roles	  
as	  Chief	  Financial	  Officers	  in	  renowned	  companies.	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  increasing	  power	  over	  thirty	  years	  of	  a	  sector	  that	  was	  still	  fairly	  
restricted	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1980’s?	  When	  asked	  this	  question,	  professionals	  in	  the	  sector	  
indicate	  the	  role	  of	  markets	  as	  playing	  a	  major	  part.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  was	  allegedly	  
increased	   investment	   demand	   (increased	   liquid	   assets),	   which	   therefore	   became	   more	  
profitable.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   seems	   there	  were	   companies	  with	   potential	   to	   grow	   (in	  
turn	  causing	  return	  on	  capital	  to	   increase)	  that	  were	  as	  yet	  untapped,	  and	  whose	  benefits	  
could	  be	  maximised	  through	  establishing	  “synergies”	  with	  other	  companies	  or	  by	  providing	  
new	  avenues	  to	  develop	  financially.	  In	  view	  of	  reallocating	  capital	  in	  the	  optimal	  way,	  sellers	  
relinquish	   companies	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   liquid	   assets	   and	   invest	   them	   more	   efficiently;	  
meanwhile,	  buyers	   take	  control	  of	  companies,	  hoping	   to	  benefit	   from	  a	  greater	   return	  on	  
invested	  capital	  than	  for	  other	  investments.	  
	  
This	   indigenous	  explanation	   is	   in	   line	  with	   the	  explanation	  given	  by	   financial	   theorists	  and	  
especially	  with	  that	  associated	  with	  the	  series	  of	  mergers	  and	  “takeovers”	  that	  occurred	  in	  
the	   1980’s	   in	   the	  United	   States	   (Fligstein	   2001).	   As	   such,	   it	   seems	   that	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
1970’s,	  the	  share	  price	  for	  many	  American	  companies	  was	  underestimated	  compared	  to	  the	  
asset	   value.	   This	   supposedly	   caused	   financial	   analysts	   and	   institutional	   investors	   to	   start	  
buying	  up	  these	  companies,	  for	  their	  share	  price	  or	  thereabouts,	  and	  to	  sell	  them	  in	  parts	  at	  
the	  asset	  value.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  managers	  acted	  efficiently	  by	  setting	  about	  re-­‐structuring	  
the	  companies	  for	  which	  they	  were	  responsible,	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  difference	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is difficult to exactly measure the number of people involved in the mergers and acquisitions market in France. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to derive an approximation based on the transactions listed in the Capital Finance journal 
of 2010. These transactions amount to 850. They involve 1200 different companies (excluding law firms) and 1500 
individuals (excluding business lawyers). These 1500 individuals occupy the highest ranking positions within these 
companies (partners in charge of transactions and engagement partners), and teams, including trainees (between 2 and 
about 10 people, depending on the scale of the transactions) must therefore be added to the figure of those who 
contributed towards the transaction 






the	  share	  price	  and	   the	  asset	  value.	  One	  approach	  was	   to	  sell	   the	  company	  divisions	   that	  
were	  under-­‐performing	  and	  re-­‐invest	  elsewhere,	  or	  even	  embark	  on	  takeovers	  and	  mergers	  
so	  as	  to	  increase	  the	  share	  price.	  
Therefore	   the	   indigenous	   explanation	   and	   the	   scholarly	   economic	   explanation	   coincide	   in	  
making	   financial	  markets	   and	   their	   performance	   the	  be-­‐all	   and	  end-­‐all	   for	   the	   increase	   in	  
corporate	   transactions.	   It	   will	   subsequently	   be	   clearly	   shown	   how,	   from	   the	   same	  
standpoint,	   this	   rise	   creates	   another	   market,	   namely	   in	   the	   area	   of	   transaction	   services,	  
causing	   banks,	   law	   firms,	   auditing	   firms	   and	   investors	   to	   review	   their	   structure	   and	   their	  
strategy	  in	  order	  to	  use	  the	  situation	  to	  their	  advantage.	  
	  
For	   all	   that,	   other	   indigenous	   interpretations	   emerged	   during	   the	   interviews	   with	  
professionals,	   such	  as	  “we	  don’t	   find	   the	  value	   (of	  a	  company),	  we	  optimise	   it!”	  and	  “our	  
profession	   has	   undergone	   self-­‐sophistication”.	   These	   two	   ideas	   reveal	   the	   role	   played	   by	  
transaction	   services	   providers	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   transaction	   market	   itself,	   hence	  
returning	   to	   a	   classic	   position	   from	   the	   field	   of	   economic	   sociology	   based	   on	   the	  
foundational	  studies	  of	  Granovetter	  or	  White.	  The	  latter	  contradicts	  the	  accepted	  economic	  
conjecture	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  markets	  should	  be	  analysed	  through	  the	  
various	   social	   mediations	   in	   which	   it	   is	   framed	   (Steiner	   2005).	   Hence,	   various	   recent	  
empirical	  studies	  highlight	   the	  role	  of	  conventions	   (Orléan	  2011;	  Karpik	  2007)	  constructed	  
by	  market	   intermediaries	   (Cochoy	  and	  Debuisson	  2000;	  Bessy	  and	  Chauvin	  2013)	  and	  that	  
are	  meaningful	  within	  specific	  relational	  structures	  (Lazega	  1999;	  Godechot	  2009),	  as	  a	  way	  
of	   explaining	   the	   nature	   and	   price	   of	   products	   traded	   on	   a	  market	   (Vatin	   2009;	   Chauvin	  
2011).	  
	  
As	  such,	  this	  second	  pair	  of	  indigenous	  and	  scholarly	  explanations	  again	  examines	  the	  issue	  
of	  the	  increasing	  power	  of	  corporate	  transactions	  over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years.	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  
ask:	   what	   is	   the	   reason	   for	   companies	   becoming	   liquid	   assets	   (Orléan	   2005)	   that	   can	   be	  
traded	  on	  a	  market?	  Why	  does	  this	  activity	  of	  trading	  aim	  to	  make	  investments	  profitable	  in	  
place	   of	   profits	   expected	   on	   dividends?	   What	   approach	   should	   be	   used	   to	   examine	   the	  
increase	  in	  the	  average	  price	  used	  when	  trading	  companies,	  which	  reached	  record	  levels	  in	  
2008?	   Indeed,	   the	   objective	   difference	   between	   the	   purchase	   price	   and	   sales	   price	   of	   a	  
company	   should	   not	   be	   given	   as	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   the	   transactions	   market.	   On	   the	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contrary,	  it	  is	  this	  difference	  that	  should	  be	  examined	  from	  a	  sociological	  point	  of	  view.	  Yet,	  
it	  cannot	  exist	  without	  there	  being	  different	  systems	  to	  calculate	  and	  optimise	  it.	  Each	  of	  the	  
following	   systems	   contributes	   towards	   presenting	   the	   “value”	   of	   companies:	   financial	  
accounting	   and	   its	   conventions;	   ratio	   analysis	   the	   profitability	   of	   investments,	   including	  
Shareholder	   Value;	   company	   valuation	   methods,	   such	   as	   physically	   itemising	   them	  
according	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   work	   is	   organised	   by	   different	   actors	   within	   the	   sector.	  
Transactions	  and	   related	  decisions	  become	  possible	   thanks	   to	  a	   set	  of	   information	   that	   is	  
standardised	   and	   shared,	  meaning	   that	   various	   companies,	   as	  well	   as	   other	   investments,	  
can	  be	  compared.	  As	  with	  any	  other	  statistical	  operation,	  standardised	  quantifying	  based	  on	  
conventional	   categories	   enables	  qualities	   to	  be	   compared,	  which	  otherwise	  would	  not	  be	  
possible	  (Desrosières,	  1993).	  
As	   a	   result,	   within	   the	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   market,	   this	   raises	   questions	   related	   to	  
constructing	   and	   using	   these	   systems	   for	  measuring	   the	   value	   of	   a	   company.	   Based	   on	   a	  
recent	   survey	   into	   the	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   sector	   in	   France,	   which	   combined	  
biographical	  interviews,	  workplace	  observations	  and	  secondary	  documentation	  (box	  1),	  this	  
article	  will	  carry	  out	  and	  present	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  these	  company	  valuation	  
systems	  in	  constructing	  this	  market.	  It	  highlights	  how	  these	  systems	  construct	  the	  idea	  that	  
corporate	   transactions	   can	   create	   value,	   and	   how	   this	   idea	   together	  with	   the	   knowledge	  
required	   to	   understand	   it,	   contribute	   towards	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   professional	   group,	  
whose	  aim	   is	   to	  carry	  out	  transactions.	   In	  this	  way,	   the	  rise	   in	  the	  number	  of	   transactions	  
over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years	  can	  therefore	  be	  explained	  less	  as	  a	  result	  of	  market	  forces,	  than	  
as	  the	  product	  of	  social	  forces	  shaping	  and	  driving	  the	  market.	  
	  
Sociological	  studies	  on	  the	  measurement	  systems	  will	  firstly	  be	  presented	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  
they	   contribute	   towards	   a	   set	   of	   questions	   about	   the	  mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   sector	   (I).	  
This	   sector	  will	   then	   be	   considered	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   organisation,	   company	  
valuation	   methods	   and	   systems	   that	   shape	   it	   (II).	   The	   analysis	   of	   these	   systems	   will	   be	  
broken	   down	   into	   three	   stages,	   since	   valuation	   as	   quantifying	   through	   abstract	   systems	  
structures	   the	   way	   in	   which	   professionals	   work	   like	   an	   activity	   resembling	   an	   abstract	  
intellectual	  game	  (III).	  Nevertheless,	  this	  game	  is	  less	  concerned	  with	  showing	  the	  objective	  
value	   of	   a	   company,	   than	   instilling	   belief	   in	   this	   very	   value,	   through	   measuring	   and	  
negotiating	   (IV).	  Finally,	  an	  examination	  of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   these	  systems	  are	  endorsed	  
6	  
	  
and	   disseminated	   foregrounds	   a	   professional	   space	   in	   which	   “value”	   and	   “valuation”	   are	  
shared	  norms,	  which	  unites	  the	  group	  in	  a	  mutual	  aim	  of	  conducting	  corporate	  transactions	  
(V).	  
	  
Box 1: Methodology 
The process has involved performing and analysing calculations made of the value of businesses that have been traded. 
This is based on the mergers and acquisitions sector in France and uses data from a research programme that dealt with 
“Carrières de la Finance” [“Careers in Finance”]5 that was conducted between 2010 and 2013. It contains qualitative 
surveys (extensive interviews about places of work, together with observation and analysis of documentation) and 
quantitative studies (building and analysing specific databases). More than 40 biographical interviews were conducted, 
some of which focussed on presenting and commenting on the methods of financial analysis that were adopted; these 
were interviews with people who at that time held one of the following positions (see below for the description of 
positions): “intermediary” (22), “reporting accountant” (12) or “lender” (7). 26 interviews of a similar nature were also 
conducted with investors (15 Chief Financial Officers and 11 responsible for investments in funds) and about ten 
interviews with other professionals with whom they work (HR Managers, recruitment consultants, permanent members 
of staff in professional organisations). Another focus of this article involves analysing workplace observations of 
reporting accountants, which includes conducting due diligence reports (see below). These reports and the stages in 
their development were analysed independently (structure, types of indicator calculated, tools used, etc.) and based on 
the resulting workplace interactions (workplace discussions between colleagues, with members of the management 
team, with clients, and with intermediaries, lenders and other reporting accountants involved in the transaction). 
Documents relating to the other stages carried out by intermediaries in order to calculate value (“pitch”, “info memo”, 
“management presentations”) could also be analysed. These analyses were compared with observations of continuous 
professional development in valuing companies and other types of event (professional meetings, forums, exhibitions, 
awards ceremonies), which bring together professionals from the mergers and acquisitions sector in France. These 
studies also include an analysis of accounting manuals, which contain an explanation of the principles of the value of a 
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5 The CARFI (Carrières de la finance) programme was funded by the ANR (Agence Nationale de la Recherche) [The 
French National Research Agency] and directed by Valérie Boussard (2011-2014), with the participation of Marlène 
Benquet, Marie-Anne Dujarier, Paul Lagneau-Ymonet and Sylvain Thine. 
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An	   analysis	   of	   the	  measuring	   tools	   and	   instruments	   has,	   since	   the	   seminal	   papers	   of	  M.	  
Berry	   (1983),	   resulted	   in	   numerous	   studies,	   each	   conducted	   from	   different	   theoretical	  
perspectives.	   These	   have	   included	   the	   following:	   approaches	   that	   focus	   on	   management	  
and	   draw	   on	   sociological	   ideas	   (Moisdon,	   1997;	   Hatchuel	   and	   Weil,	   1992;	   Girin,	   1983;	  
Walter,	  2011);	  the	  sociology	  of	  categorisation	  (Desrosières,	  1993;	  Chiapello,	  2005;	  	  Eyraud,	  
2003);	  the	  sociology	  of	  collective	  action	  (Lascoumes	  et	  Le	  Gallès,	  2004;	  Bezes	  et	  Siné,	  2011);	  
an	   anthropology	   of	   science	   (Muniesa,	   2005;	   Knorr-­‐Cetina,	   2005)	   and	   the	   sociology	   of	  
management	   (Maugeri,	   2001;	   Boussard	   et	   Maugeri,	   2003;	   Metzger	   et	   Benedetto,	   2008).	  
Each	   of	   these	   have	   therefore	   led	   to	   heuristic	   analyses	   of	   the	   role	   played	   by	   tools,	  
instruments,	   techniques	   and	   evaluation	   methods	   in	   constructing	   and	   animating	   social	  
relations.	  Consequently,	  the	  term	  “systems”	  will	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  such	  tools,	  instruments,	  
techniques	   and	   methods,	   hence	   taking	   a	   Foucauldian	   standpoint	   to	   emphasise	   the	  
connection	   between	   diverse	   constitutive	   elements	   but	   equally	   their	   role	   in	   social	   power	  
(Boussard,	   Maugeri,	   2003).	   Three	   aspects	   aptly	   summarise	   the	   ways	   they	   affect	   social	  
relations	  and	  are	  affected	  by	  them,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  framing	  of	  social	  action	  
that	  these	  specialised	  systems	  establish,	  the	  second	  to	  their	  performativity	  and	  the	  third	  to	  
the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  they	  are	  disseminated	  and	  endorsed.	  
	  
1.1. The	  framing	  of	  social	  action	  by	  systems	  
	  
Every	  study	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  measurement	  systems	  emphasises	  both	  their	  cognitive	  and	  
political	  aspects.	  
In	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   economics	   of	   conventions,	   resulting	   from	   “formal	   investments”	  
(Thévenot,	  1985),	   the	  systems	  are	  understood	  as	  social	   forms	  that	  allow	  actions	  to	  be	  co-­‐
ordinated,	  the	  actions	  themselves	  being	  “collective,	  cognitive	  systems”	  (Orléan,	  1989).	  They	  
constitute	  a	  shared	  framework	  in	  which	  interpretations	  are	  made,	  setting	  out	  the	  scope	  of	  
possibilities	  as	  well	  as	  ensuring	  that	  knowledge	  is	  developed	  and	  utilised.	  This	  view	  allowed	  
A.	  Derosières	  (1993)	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  national	  statistical	  system,	  with	  its	  objectives,	  
terminology,	   graphs	  and	  models,	   creates	   categories	  and	   “beings”,	   the	  basis	   for	  describing	  
the	  world	  and	  acting	  on	  it.	  A	  relationship	  is	  established	  between	  the	  cognitive	  dimension	  of	  
conventions	   and	   technical	   components	   (norms,	   standards,	   regulations,	   contracts,	  
mathematical	  models,	  graphical	  elements,	  etc.),	  hence	  endowing	  them	  with	  a	  physical	  form.	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The	  mediating	   role	   played	   by	   objectives	  within	   social	   interactions	   (Conein,	   1994,	   Conein,	  
Dodier,	   Thévenot,	   1993),	   causes	   the	  measurement	   systems	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   sort	   of	  
“conventional	  support	  for	  action”	  (Dodier,	  1993).	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  anthropology	  of	  science	  and	  technology,	  the	  measurement	  systems	  also	  play	  
a	   part	   in	   constructing	   and	   regulating	   problems	   and	   the	  way	   in	  which	   they	   are	   perceived	  
(Garcia,	  1986).	   They	  contribute	   towards	   the	   task	  of	   conveying	  problems,	  and	  of	  providing	  
incentives	  to	  actors,	  through	  their	  ability	  to	  give	  a	  solid,	  physical	  form	  to	  the	  different	  social	  
relations	   at	   play,	   as	   shown	   by	   F.	   Muniesa	   based	   on	   the	   example	   of	   the	   transition	   from	  
auctions	  to	  trading	  securities	  electronically	  on	  the	  Paris	  Stock	  Exchange	  (Muniesa,	  2005).	  In	  
so	  doing,	   these	   systems	  give	  direction	   to	  work,	  becoming	  both	  visible	  and	   invisible,	  much	  
like	   the	   screens	   providing	   instant	   information	   globally	   in	   trading	   rooms	   (Knorr-­‐Cettina,	  
2005),	   or	   mathematical	   formulae	   and	   models	   that	   are	   used	   in	   financial	   arbitrage	   (Mac	  
Kenzie,	  Millo,	  2003	  ;	  Godechot,	  2001).	  
These	   studies	   are	   in	   line	   with	   the	   seminal	   ideas	   of	   Michel	   Berry	   (1983),	   which	   make	  
management	   tools	   (especially	   outcome	   indicators	   and	   performance	   indicators)	   “invisible	  
technology”	   in	   that	   they	  provide	   (true	   and	   accurate)	   summaries,	  which	   in	   turn	   structures	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  actors	  behave.	  He	  illustrates	  the	  example	  of	  bankers,	  whose	  profession	  is	  
under	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  few	  simple	  ratios,	  tools	  and	  pieces	  of	  terminology	  that	  are	  used	  by	  
their	  superiors,	  even	  though	  they	  feel	  that	  they	  avoid	  any	  technical	  determinism.	  
However,	   according	   to	  M.	   Berry,	   this	   invisible	   technology	   is	   all	   the	  more	   powerful	   as	   the	  
measurement	   systems	   act	   to	   “crystallize	   the	   power	   relations”.	   In	   the	   vocabulary	   of	   the	  
anthropology	   of	   science,	   these	   are	   “cooled”	   controversies	   (Callon,	   Latour,	   1990),	   which	  
takes	   an	   even	   stronger	   Foucauldian	   standpoint	   to	   analyse	   them	   as	   political	   systems.	   The	  
philosophy	  of	  management	  that	  they	  incorporate	  is	  thus	  a	  view	  of	  the	  world	  embedded	  in	  
the	   power	   relations	   that	   the	   systems	   introduce	   “illegally”	   (Maugeri,	   2001).	   	   Similarly,	   the	  
instruments	  used	  to	  measure	  public	  action	  can	  be	  analysed	  as	  a	  “convenient	  smoke	  screen”	  
so	  as	  to	  depoliticise	  topics	  that	  are	  fundamentally	  political,	  by	  focussing	  on	  their	  apparent	  
neutrality	  (Lascoumes	  and	  Le	  Galès,	  2004).	  	  
The	   cognitive	   framing	   performed	   by	   these	   instruments	   should	   therefore	   be	   analysed	   as	  
constructed,	   with	   roots	   in	   specific	   social	   relations,	   which	   it	   contributes	   towards	   (re-­‐




1.2.	  	   The	  performativity	  of	  systems	  
	  
Following	  on	   from	   the	   ideas	  of	  M.	  Callon	   (1998),	   the	   systems	  have	  also	  been	  analysed	   in	  
terms	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  empirically	  create	  the	  phenomena	  that	  they	  measure.	  This	  ability	  is	  
referred	   to	   as	   performativity	   (Callon,	   Muniesa,	   2010),	   drawing	   on	   the	   pragmatics	   of	  
language	  (Austin,	  1955).	  McKenzie	  and	  Millo	  (2003)	  showed	  how	  through	  the	  traders	  of	  the	  
Chicago	  Board	  Options	  Exchange	  applying	  the	  theoretical	  equation	  of	  Black-­‐Scholes-­‐Merton,	  
this	   caused	   the	   prices	   of	   derivatives	   to	   become	   aligned	   with	   the	   theoretical	   model,	   a	  
process	  that	  actually	  was	  not	  possible	  before	  models	  were	  systematized	  and	  computerised.	  
This	   performative	   effect	   of	   economic	   or	   financial	   theory	   deals	   more	   with	   “the	   issue	   of	  
arranging	   elements”	   than	   with	   the	   effects	   of	   utterances	   and	   thoughts	   per	   se	   (Callon,	  
Muniesa,	   2010).	   	   It	   is	   precisely	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   a	   routine	   for	   performing	  
calculations,	  made	  possible	  by	  software	  and	  prescriptive	  models,	  that	  the	  theory	  becomes	  
reality	  (MacKenzie,	  2004,	  Montagne,	  2006,	  Walter,	  2011).	  
Another	   way	   of	   analysing	   this	   performativity	   is	   based	   more	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   self-­‐fulfilling	  
prophecies,	   as	   adopted	  by	  R.K.	  Merton.	   This	   idea	   considers	  how	  belief	   in	   the	  effects	  of	   a	  
theory	  or	  model	  produces	   the	  effects	   consistent	  with	   this	  belief.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   due	   to	   a	  
group	   of	   actors	   believing	   in	   neoclassical	   economics	   that	   they	   act	   according	   to	   it	   and	  
transform	   the	   market	   (Lebaron,	   2000,	   Fourcade,	   2009).	   From	   this	   perspective,	   the	  
measurement	  systems	  are	  also	  statements	  of	  a	  “Logos	  of	  management”	  (Boussard,	  2008).	  
This	   statement,	   which	   is	   repeated	   and	   reinforced	   every	   time	   the	   systems	   are	   put	   into	  
practice,	   has	   performative	   effects.	   It	   spreads	   the	   belief	   in	   a	   specific	   definition	   of	  
performance	  and	  makes	  this	  a	  social	  norm	  (Meyer,	  1994).	  As	  a	  result,	   those	  organisations	  
that	  set	  up	  legitimate	  tools	  for	  measuring	  performance,	  such	  as	  audits	  (Power,	  1997),	  earn	  a	  
positive	   reputation.	   This	   effect	   is	   therefore	   based	   on	   the	   processes	   of	   imitation	   between	  
organisations	   and	   professionals	   (DiMaggio	   and	   Powell,	   1983),	   whereby	   organisations	   and	  
actors	   conform	   to	   legitimate	   norms	   within	   their	   field.	   Moreover,	   performance	  
measurements,	  which	  lead	  to	  ranking	  systems,	  play	  a	  part	  in	  reinforcing	  the	  status	  of	  those	  
who	  are	  ranked	  most	  highly,	  while	  also	  modifying	  their	  conduct	  in	  order	  to	  manipulate	  the	  
indicators	  that	  measure	  the	  position	  (Espeland	  and	  Sauder,	  2007).	  This	  performative	  effect	  
of	  performing	  measurements	   results	   in	  a	  disparity	  between	  the	  measurements,	  which	  are	  
taken	   as	   fact,	   and	   the	   phenomenon	   that	   they	   are	   supposedly	   presenting,	   yet	   which	   are	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often	   a	   lot	   more	   complex,	   multifaceted	   and	   contradictory,	   as	   shown	   by	   the	   disparity	  
between	   the	   ratings	   assigned	   to	   subprime	  mortgages	   prior	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis	   in	   2008,	  
and	  the	  situation	  in	  its	  inverted	  form	  in	  more	  recent	  years.	  
	  
1.3.	  	   	  Disseminating	  and	  endorsing	  systems	  
	  
Before	   they	   became	   “cooled”	   controversies,	   the	   systems	   resulted	   in	   very	   animated	  
controversies,	   which	   drew	   attention	   from	   various	   actors	   or	   groups	   of	   actors.	   Through	  
analysing	   the	   systems,	   this	   reveals	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	   they	   were	   created	   and	  
disseminated,	  by	  uncovering	  the	  process	  by	  which	  certain	  actors	  managed	  to	  convey	  their	  
own	   issues,	   by	   way	   of	   the	   systems,	   and	   how	   through	   groups	   joining	   forces	   and	   making	  
compromises,	  the	  physical	  form	  of	  the	  systems	  was	  defined,	  which	  turns	  out	  to	  have	  little	  
relation	  to	  the	  theoretical	  form	  (Segrestin,	  2004;	  Muniesa,	  2005).	  The	  Europe-­‐wide	  analysis	  
conducted	   by	   E.	   Chiapello	   and	   K.	   Medjad	   (2007)	   examines	   the	   process	   of	   enactment	   of	  
accounting	  standards	  by	  the	  IASB,	  an	  actor	  in	  private	  law.	  The	  study	  unequivocally	  shows	  on	  
the	   one	   hand	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   motives	   for	   the	   choice	   of	   specialised	   rules	   in	  
accounting,	   and	  on	  other	   hand	   the	   social	   relations,	   especially	   the	   influence	   and	   lobbying,	  
which	  exist	  unseen.	  	  
Another	  way	  of	  analysing	  these	  systems	  being	  disseminated	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  various	  actors	  
involved	   in	   this	   process,	   in	   the	   position	   of	   “market	   professionals”	   (Cochoy,	   Dubuisson,	  
2000).	  Indeed,	  these	  systems	  could	  not	  be	  spread	  among	  users,	  who	  after	  all	  do	  not	  know	  a	  
lot	  about	  their	  quality	  and	  performance,	  without	  being	  endorsed,	  and	  especially	  “endorsed	  
through	   judgement”	   (Hatchuel,	  1995).	  These	  endorsements	  play	  a	  part	   in	  establishing	   the	  
value	   of	   objects	   (Karpick,	   2007	   Bessy	   and	   Chauvin,	   2013)	   and	   they	   are	   carried	   out	   as	  
technical	  advice,	  provided	  by	  experts,	  and	  equally	  as	  ranking	  systems,	  guidelines,	  rating,	  and	  
so	   on.	   Market	   professionals	   who	   handle	   the	   measurement	   systems	   –	   teachers,	   tutors,	  
consultants,	   software	   editors	   and	   so	   on	   –	   play	   an	   essential	   part	   here;	   they	   give	   value	   to	  
certain	  systems	  rather	  than	  others,	  hence	  helping	  to	  establish	  and	  legitimise	  conventions.	  F.	  
Lordon	   thoroughly	   demonstrated	   this	   process	   based	   on	   a	   new	  measure	   of	   capital	   value,	  
EVA,	   starting	  with	   its	   creation	   in	   the	   1970’s,	   and	   then	   to	   the	   1990’s	   during	  which	   it	  was	  
promoted	  and	  its	  use	  became	  widespread.	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This	  reading	  can	  be	  supplemented	  by	  a	  perspective	  that	  draws	  on	  ideas	  from	  the	  sociology	  
of	  professions	  (Freidson,	  1986;	  Abbott,	  1988).	  The	  measurement	  systems	  are	  considered	  as	  
sources	   of	   knowledge,	  which	   occupational	   groups	   use	   as	   the	   foundation	   for	   building	   and	  
defending	   the	   boundaries	   of	   their	   territory	   of	   professional	   interest	   (Boussard,	   2008).	  
Analysing	  the	  systems	  in	  this	  way	  comes	  down	  to	  understanding,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  social	  
relations	  involved	  in	  disseminating	  these	  processes,	  what	  causes	  professional	  knowledge	  to	  
become	   institutionalised	   and	   legitimised,	   and	   likewise	   for	   the	   disagreements	   within	   and	  
between	  professionals	  that	  are	  thus	  resolved.	  
	  
2.	  Valuing	  companies	  within	  the	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  market	  
	  
The	   three	   sociological	  aspects	  of	   the	  measurement	   systems	  –	   framing,	  performativity	  and	  
dissemination/endorsement	  –	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  the	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  market	  to	  
be	  examined,	   in	   that	   this	  market	   is	  based	  on	  a	  core	  activity	   that	   is	   structured	  and	  shared	  
among	   various	   actors.	   This	   activity	   involves	   calculating	   the	   value	   that	   transactions	   will	  
create	  and	  hence	  the	  value	  of	  the	  companies	  that	  are	  being	  traded.	  
Buyers	  and	  sellers	  of	  companies,	  and	  investors	  fall	  into	  three	  categories,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  is	  
made	  up	  of	  business	  owners	  (often	  of	  SMEs),	  the	  second	  being	  financial	  executives	  or	  Chief	  
Financial	   Officers	   of	   large	   corporations	   who	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   shareholders,	   and	   the	   third	  
being	   directors	   of	   specialised	   investment	   funds,	   known	   as	   Private	   Equity	   funds.	   Although	  
members	  of	  the	  first	  category	  participate	  on	  few	  occasions,	  often	  even	  only	  once,	  the	  two	  
others	   perform	   several	   transactions	   and	   are	   buyers	   or	   sellers,	   depending	   on	   the	  
circumstances.	  
2.1.	  Agreeing	  on	  a	  measure	  of	  value	  
In	   terms	   of	   value	   creation	   for	   the	   shareholder	   or	   “Shareholder	   Value”,	   which	   became	  
popular	   and	   widespread	   from	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   1980’s6,	   investors	   are	   responsible	   for	  
calculating,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  comparing,	  what	  will	  be	  the	  return	  on	  their	  invested	  capital.	  
While	  EVA	  is	  becoming	  one	  of	  the	  measurements	  tools	  aimed	  at	  investors	  in	  shares	  (Lordon,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





2000),	  other	  methods	  are	  employed	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  investing	  in	  a	  whole	  company7.	  The	  
purpose	  is	  to	  evaluate	  a	  company,	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  past	  and	  present	  situation,	  as	  
well	   as	   forecasts	   for	   the	   future.	   This	   analysis	  makes	   it	   possible	   to	  work	   out	   the	   potential	  
value	  resulting	  from	  this	  transaction,	  together	  with	  the	  buying	  or	  selling	  price	  of	  a	  company	  
that	   will	   generate	   this	   value.	   Buyers	   and	   sellers	   can	   therefore	   gauge	   the	   return	   on	   their	  
capital	   investment	   or	   divestment,	   based	   on	   a	   comparison	   with	   other	   options	   for	   capital	  
investments.	  In	  order	  to	  calculate	  this	  value,	  three	  methods,	  each	  with	  different	  conjectures	  
and	   results,	   are	   used	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   namely	   the	   patrimonial	   method,	   the	   multiples	  
approach	   and	   discounted	   cash	   flow	   analysis.	   In	   order	   to	   implement	   these	  methods,	   it	   is	  
necessary	  to	  initially	  analyse	  the	  balance	  sheet	  as	  well	  as	  the	  profit	  and	  loss	  account	  of	  the	  
company	  in	  question;	  this	  provides	  accounting	  data	  that	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  reliable,	  which	  will	  
be	   used	   in	   the	   formulae	   for	   calculating	   value.	   Another	   process	   is	   also	   applied,	   that	   of	  
drawing	  up	  a	  business	  plan,	  or	   in	  other	  words	  modelling	   the	   future	   financial	  performance	  
based	   on	   a	   range	   of	   conjectures	   on	   how	   companies	   operate	   (fluctuation	   in	   turnover,	  
production	  costs,	  financing	  costs,	  etc.).	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  forecast	  the	  future	  performance	  of	  the	  
company	  and	  use	  this	  result	  to	  calculate	  the	  current	  value	  (and	  hence	  the	  resale	  price).	   In	  
addition,	   the	   value	   “created”	   by	   the	   transaction	   can	   be	   measured	   using	   groupings	   that	  
involve	   the	   other	   companies	   owned	   by	   the	   buyer	   or	   companies	   that	   result	   from	  
restructuring	  (“synergies”)	  or	  both	  of	  these	  groups.	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2.2.	  Measuring	  value	  and	  the	  intermediary	  role	  of	  analysts	  
In	  order	  to	  measure	  value,	  investors	  mostly	  sub-­‐contract	  processes	  to	  intermediaries,	  each	  
of	  whom	  plays	  a	  particular	  role.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  intermediate	  analysts	  who	  are	  referred	  to	  
as	  “matchmakers”	  (investment	  banks	  and	  sometimes	  business	  lawyers)	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  
investor	  by	  suggesting	  a	  transaction,	  arranging	  this	   transaction,	  assessing	  the	  value	  of	   this	  
transaction	  and	  providing	  advice	  during	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  the	  price	  being	  negotiated.	  
The	  three	  methods	  for	  measuring	  the	  value	  of	  a	  company:	  
1) The	  patrimonial	  method	  is	  the	  eldest	  of	  the	  three.	  It	  involves	  gauging	  the	  value	  
of	  a	  company	  based	  on	  the	  value	  of	  its	  assets	  (modulo	  the	  debt).	  As	  such,	  this	  
method	  is	  based	  on	  the	  balance	  sheet	  and	  produces	  a	  summary	  of	  historical	  
value.	  
2) The	  multiples	  approach	  or	  the	  method	  of	  comparables	  calculates	  the	  value	  
based	  	   on	  the	  market	  value	  (price)	  recorded	  for	  similar	  transactions.	  This	  
price	  is	  modelled	  	   as	  a	  multiple	  of	  the	  EBITDA	  of	  a	  company.	  The	  EBITDA	  is	  an	  
accounting	  measure,	  	   taken	  from	  the	  English	  accounting	  term	  (“Earning	  
Before	  Interests,	  Taxes,	  	   Depreciations	  and	  Amortizations”),	  which	  measures	  
profit	  before	  deducting	  tax	  	   expenses	  and	  financing	  costs.	  Calculating	  the	  
EBITDA	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  	  multiples	  approach	  (for	  example,	  in	  a	  certain	  
sector,	  companies	  sell	  for	  “6	  times	  	   their	  EBITDA”).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  focus	  
is	  no	  longer	  on	  the	  balance	  sheet,	  but	  rather	  	   the	  profit	  and	  loss	  account,	  
which	  features	  the	  EBITDA	  that	  has	  been	  achieved.	  The	  value	  is	  based	  on	  
historical	  data,	  but	  is	  no	  longer	  simply	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  company,	  but	  is	  relative	  
to	  the	  state	  of	  the	  market	  (the	  multiples	  recorded).	  
3) DCF	  (Discounted	  cash	  flow)	  analysis	  is	  the	  most	  recently	  adopted	  of	  the	  
methods	  and	  also	  the	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  financial	  markets.	  It	  involves	  using	  
the	  future	   cash	  flow	  of	  the	  company	  for	  current	  purposes,	  based	  on	  the	  cost	  
of	  capital.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  value	  is	  neither	  historical	  nor	  intrinsic,	  but	  is	  created	  
by	  making	  future	  projections	  and	  examining	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  financial	  
structure	  of	  the	  company	  (especially	  debt)	  and	  the	  financial	  market	  that	  





They	  are	  also	  supported	  by	  other	  intermediate	  analysts,	  known	  as	  “reporting	  accountants”,	  
who	  produce	  reports	  on	  the	  company	  and	  testify	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  financial	  data	  used	  to	  
value	   the	   company,	  or	   to	  economic	   conjectures	   (auditing	   firms,	  finance	  consulting	  
firms,	   strategic	   consulting	   firms).	   These	   “reporting	   accountants”	   produce	  
reports,	  known	  as	  “due	  diligence”8	  reports.	  Finally,	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  transactions,	  buyers	  
go	  to	  bankers,	  the	  “lenders”,	  who	  receive	  the	  various	  documents	  for	  analysing	  and	  valuing	  
that	   is	   being	   handled	   in	   the	   transaction.	   Bankers	   conduct	   their	   own	   financial	   analysis	   in	  
order	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  loan	  to	  be	  given	  and	  its	  rate.	  This	  analysis	  focuses	  more	  
on	  calculating	  risk	  than	  calculating	  value.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  process	  of	  financing	  contributes	  
towards	   the	  price	  being	   fixed,	   in	   that	   it	   affects	   the	   return	  on	  capital	   and	  hence	   the	  value	  
created.	  
Matchmakers,	  reporting	  accountants	  (and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  lenders)	  are	  therefore	  analysts,	  
intermediaries	   in	   this	  M&A	  market,	  whose	  role,	  as	  has	  been	  seen,	   involves	  presenting,	  on	  
behalf	  of	  their	  client,	  the	  “objective	  value”	  of	  the	  company,	  to	  adopt	  the	  expression	  used	  by	  
one	  of	  the	  people	  surveyed9.	  
	  
2.3.	  A	  divided	  work	  process	  
The	   process	   of	   calculating	   this	   “objective	   value”	   is	   performed	   several	   times,	   by	   different	  
actors,	   from	   the	   buyers'	   side,	   from	   the	   sellers'	   side	   and	   from	   both	   sides,	   by	   investors'	  
analysts	   and	   by	   all	   intermediate	   analysts	   that	   they	   consult.	   As	   such,	   there	   are	   several	  
“values”	  that	  are	  calculated,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  objective.	  The	  price	  or	  “market	  
value”	   that	   the	   buyer	   ends	   up	   paying,	   results	   from	   the	   “values”	   being	   compared	   and	  
debated.	   Most	   of	   this	   process	   is	   organised	   and	   occurs	   in	   different	   stages,	   entrusted	   to	  
others	  and	  involving	  them	  meeting.	  This	  process	  would	  be	  too	  long	  to	  describe	  here,	  but	  it	  
can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  three	  parts.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  on	  the	  seller's	  side,	  when	  investors	  
want	   to	   sell	   a	   company,	   they	   often	   have	   an	   idea	   of	   the	   “(shareholder)	   value”	   that	   they	  
would	   like	   to	   create,	  hence	   the	  “value”	  of	   the	  company,	  and	   the	  price	   they	  would	   like	   to	  
obtain	  for	   it.	   Intermediaries	  who	  advise	  the	   investor,	  will	   themselves	  analyse	  the	  situation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In French, the English term “due diligence” tends to be adopted. The meaning of the term is that these reports 
authenticate the resulting data. 
9	   Purchasers also use lawyers, who draw up contracts for the transaction and intervene in the negotiations when 




and	   produce	   their	   own	   “value”	   for	   the	   company,	   which	  may	   or	  may	   not	   agree	   with	   the	  
investor's	  calculated	  value.	  If	  it	  is	  decided	  that	  the	  sale	  will	  go	  ahead,	  reporting	  accountants	  
are	   responsible	   for	   conducting	   a	  more	   thorough	   financial	   analysis	   (due	  diligence	   reports),	  
which	   will	   itself	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   other	   calculations.	   Through	   collecting	   and	   auditing	  
information,	   conducting	   interviews	   with	   the	   company’s	   management	   team,	   holding	  
meetings	   between	   the	   main	   interested	   parties,	   making	   telephone	   calls,	   and	   so	   on,	   the	  
“value”	  of	  the	  company	  for	  the	  seller	  can	  therefore	  be	  constructed	  and	  justified.	  Between	  
the	  buyers	  and	  seller,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  reporting	  accountants	  of	  each	  potential	  buyer	  
meet	   the	   seller’s	   reporting	   accountants,	   in	   official	   sessions	   known	   as	   “Question	   and	  
Answer”	  sessions,	  during	  which	  they	  can	  examine	  and	  interrogate	  the	  figures,	  and	  therefore	  
the	   value	   of	   the	   company,	   suggested	   by	   the	   seller.	   This	   enables	   the	   buyers’	   reporting	  
accountants	   to	  produce	   their	  own	  due	  diligence	   report,	  and	   to	  construct	   their	  own	  value.	  
Finally,	  when	  decisions	   are	  made,	   the	   seller’s	   intermediaries	   arrange	  meetings,	  which	   are	  
known	   as	   negotiations,	   in	   which	   buyers	   and	   intermediaries	   meet	   the	   seller,	   in	   order	   to	  
suggest	  prices,	  utilising	  the	  reports	  that	  have	  already	  been	  drawn	  up	  about	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
company.	  These	  meetings	  are	  often	  followed	  up	  by	  telephone	  calls	  and	  other	  more	  informal	  
sessions.	   It	   is	   therefore	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   observe	   them,	   especially	   as	   they	   are	  
confidential	   and	   involve	   very	   few	   people.	  While	   these	   negotiations	   form	   the	   culminating	  
stage	  during	  which	  the	  price	  is	  fixed,	  they	  remain	  completely	  dependent	  on	  the	  supporting	  
stages	  without	  which	  they	  could	  not	  exist10	  and	  which	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  analysis.	  
	  
3.	  Quantifying:	  an	  abstract,	  intellectual	  game	  
As	  has	  already	  been	  highlighted,	   the	  ability	   to	  value	  a	  company	  relies	  on	   financial	   reports	  
being	  produced	  about	  the	  company.	  These	  reports	  act	  to	  quantify	  the	  company,	  based	  on	  
accounting	  statements	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  conjectures	  of	  how	  companies	  operate	  on	  the	  
other	  hand.	  These	  conjectures	  are	  shared	  across	  all	  actors,	  and	  form	  the	  common	  ground	  of	  
their	  work.	  
	  
3.1.	  A	  structured	  process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Just as in a game of chess, the final turn is only possible given all of the previous turns. 
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The	  process	  of	  quantifying	  is	  arranged	  by	  dividing	  work	  vertically	  and	  horizontally	  with	  the	  
youngest	  and	  least	  experienced	  analysts	  assigned	  to	  the	  most	  menial	  and	  repetitive	  tasks	  of	  
collecting	  and	  auditing	  data,	  recorded	  in	  tables	  then	  compiled	  into	  the	  report.	  Yet	  both	  the	  
structure	  and	  content	  of	  this	  report	  have	  already	  been	  determined	  and	  are	  standardised	  by	  	  
the	  management	   team,	   hence	  making	   them	   “collective	   cognitive	   system”	   (Orléan,	   1989).	  
Young	  analysts	  must	  fill	  in	  clearly	  defined	  tables,	  based	  on	  very	  specific	  accounting	  data	  or	  
financial	   data.	   While	   the	   general	   structure	   of	   the	   reports	   varies	   from	   one	   group	   of	  
intermediaries	  to	  another,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  data	  itself	  that	  is	  produced	  nor	  the	  
methods	  used	   to	  audit	   this	  data.	  The	  data	   is	  based	  on	  accounting	  categories	   (all	  of	  which	  
were	  found	  to	  be	  American	  in	  our	  examination),	  as	  well	  as	  on	  national	  or	  international	  rules	  
or	   both	   in	   relation	   to	  handling	   and	  processing	   accounting	  data.	   The	   resulting	   information	  
fills	  several	  hundreds	  of	  pages,	  yet	  fall	   into	  three	  macro-­‐categories,	  which	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  
each	  review,	  namely	  EBITDA,	  cash	  flow	  and	  debt.	  
Another	  aim	  of	  the	  resulting	  business	  plans	  is	  to	  ultimately	  “model”	  these	  three	  significant	  
indicators,	   by	   testing	   different	   conjectures	   and	   evaluating	   their	   effect	   on	   the	   indicators.	  
When	   financiers	   quantify	   the	   company,	   they	   do	   so	   by	   drawing	   mathematical	   relations	  
between	   the	   company's	  economic	  data	   (products,	  markets,	   competition,	  production,	  etc.)	  
and	   the	   three	   key	   indicators	   that	   should	   emerge	   from	   their	   analysis.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	  
significant	   indicators	   (Boussard,	   2001)	   and	   mathematical	   modelling	   act	   as	   invisible	  
technology	  (Berry,	  1983)	  giving	  direction	  to	  analysts'	  work.	  
	  
3.2.	  Distancing	  and	  omitting	  
In	  order	   to	  compile	   these	  reports,	  analysts	  base	   their	  work	  on	  data	   that	   itself	  has	  already	  
been	   processed	   and	   was	   either	   produced	   by	   the	   company	   in	   question	   or	   is	   provided	   in	  
databases.	  This	  involves	  laboratory	  work,	  conducted	  in	  a	  so-­‐called	  “data	  room”¹⁰,	  away	  from	  
the	  company	  itself.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  analysts	  handling	  the	  transaction	  are	  all	  gathered	  in	  the	  
same	  room	  containing	  all	  the	  data	  to	  be	  analysed	  while	  the	  project	  is	  under	  way.	  
The	  accounting	  and	  financial	  categories	  that	  they	  audit,	  produce	  or	  both	  audit	  and	  produce	  
are	   expressed	   as	   acronyms	   and,	   what	   is	  more,	   they	   are	   in	   English	   [for	   French	   speakers].	  
These	   acronyms,	   together	  with	   other	  Anglicisms,	  make	  up	   a	  major	   part	   of	   the	   exchanges	  
between	  financiers,	   in	  relation	  to	  working	  on	  reports.	  Hence	  the	  way	   in	  which	  such	  terms	  
are	  formulated,	  means	  that	  the	  physical	  economic	  material	  referred	  to	  by	  these	  categories	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becomes	   abstract	   and	   intangible.	   For	   example,	   EBITDA,	  which	   is	   central	   to	   the	   reports,	   is	  
one	  of	  the	  concepts	  that	  expresses	  profit,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  an	  economic	  category	  and	  even	  a	  	  
moral	   category.	   Similarly,	   discussing	   COGS11	   (for	   costs),	   FTE12	   (for	   full-­‐time	   equivalent)	   or	  
OPEX13	   (for	   operating	   expenses)	   avoids	   discussing	   the	   costs	   of	   staff,	   jobs,	   down-­‐sizing,	  
reorganisation	   and	   so	   on.	   Financial	   categories	   are	   abstract,	   hence	   forming	   a	   distance	  
between	   them	   and	   the	  more	   physical	   and	   controversial	   terms	   and	   categories	   to	   refer	   to	  
how	   companies	   operate	   economically.	   One	   reporting	   accountant	   made	   the	   following	  
comment	  concerning	  a	  table	  for	  a	  due	  diligence	  report,	  which	  shows	  the	  increase	  in	  profit	  
after	  a	  number	  of	  staff	  had	  been	  laid	  off:	  “Afterwards,	  we'll	  deal	  with	  operating	  costs.	  The	  
cost	  of	  management	  is	  a	  given.	  How	  much	  would	  it	  be	  if	  we	  wanted	  to	  make	  cuts?	  This	  is	  
essentially	   how	   a	   cost	   is	   broken	   down.	   Breaking	   down	   a	   cost	   allows	   synergies	   to	   be	  
formed.”	  	  
Through	  these	  analytical	  categories,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  companies	  operate	  economically	  and	  
the	  physical	  effects	  become	  invisible.	  This	  happens	  in	  favour	  of	  another	  effect,	  presented	  in	  
another	  category,	  namely	  that	  of	  value.	  Indeed,	  the	  three	  significant	  indicators	  equally	  allow	  
for	   the	   “value”	   of	   the	   company	   to	   be	   calculated	   (see	   box	   2).	   The	   various	   economic	  
processes,	  modelled	  using	  mathematical	  and	  financial	  relations,	  are	  therefore	  considered	  in	  
terms	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  “create	  value”.	  
	  
3.3.	  Pleasures	  in	  measures	  
Although	   these	   laborious,	   repetitive,	   painstaking	   and	   intensive	   tasks	   deter	   some	   young	  
novices,	  those	  who	  do	  continue	  work	  in	  this	  field	  express	  a	  genuine	  interest	  for	  it,	  expressed	  
in	   the	   form	   of	   pleasure	   in	   or	   enthusiasm	   for	   working	   with	   figures.	   This	   joy	   could	   be	  
compared	  to	  the	  joy	  of	  hunting	  (for	  treasure),	  or	  of	  puzzles,	  as	  games	  that	  require	  a	  piece	  of	  
information	  or	  a	   solution	   to	  be	   found	  hidden	  among	  a	  series	  of	  obstacles.	  Analysts	  hence	  
speak	   of	   their	  work	   as	   a	   “Sudoku”	   or	   a	   “Rubik's	   cube”.	   In	   reporting	   accountant's	   offices,	  
work	   is	  therefore	  carried	  out	   in	  almost	  complete	  silence.	  The	  only	  sounds	  to	  be	  heard	  are	  
the	   tapping	   of	   fingers	   on	   keyboards	   and	   the	   rustling	   of	   paperwork.	   Yet	   there	   are	   often	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  COGS = Cost of Goods Sold	  
 
12 Full Time Employment 
13 Operating Expenditure 
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exclamations	  of	  “Yes,	  I've	  got	  it!”	  and	  “It's	  a	  wrap”	  that	  break	  this	  silence	  and	  indicate	  that	  
the	  search	  for	  a	  particular	  figure	  has	  been	  successful.	  
The	  pleasure	  derived	  from	  this	  type	  of	  work	  is	  also	  related	  to	  building	  mathematical	  models	  
and	  configuring	  them	  so	  as	  to	  find	  the	  right	  solution,	  that	  is,	  different	  values	  that	  satisfy	  the	  
equation.	   The	   equation	   in	   question	   refers	   back	   to	   assessing	   the	   company.	   Solving	   this	  
equation	  is	  a	  mathematical	  process,	  which	  acts	  as	  a	  euphemism	  for	  the	  decisions	  involved	  in	  
this	  process.	  For	  example,	  returning	  to	  the	  previous	  quote,	  it	  involves	  “stating	  how	  much	  it	  
would	  be	   if	  we	  wanted	   to	  make	   cuts”	   in	  order	   to	   “state	  how	  much	  would	  be	  earned	   if	   a	  
section	  were	   cut”.	   This	   task	   is	   considered	   to	  be	  one	  of	   the	  most	  appealing	  and	  enjoyable	  
parts	  of	  this	  job:	  
“This	  type	  of	  work	  is	  all-­‐encompassing.	  The	  thing	  I	  loved	  was	  that	  at	  the	  beginning	  there	  is	  
nothing.	  The	  table	  is	  empty	  and	  you	  envisage	  a	  transaction	  in	  your	  mind,	  such	  as	  considering	  
companies	  X	  and	  Y,	  you	  tell	  yourself	   that	  you	  must	  bring	  them	  together.	  Out	  of	   five	   ideas,	  
one	  of	  them	  will	  create	  value,	  jobs...	  it's	  like	  magic”	  (an	  intermediary).	  
	  
The	  systems	  adopted	  to	  quantify	  a	  company,	  which	  are	  set	  up	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  present	  
the	  select	  few	  variables	  that	  affect	  “value”,	  play	  a	  part	  in	  defining	  the	  work	  of	  analysts	  and	  
the	  related	  norms.	  However,	  beyond	  this,	  through	  the	  significant	  accounting	  categories	  and	  
the	   abstract,	   mathematical,	   intellectual	   game	   that	   connect	   them,	   these	   systems	   also	  
produce	  cognitive,	  moral	  and,	  ultimately,	  professional	  categories	  upon	  which	  their	  work	  and	  
companies	   are	  based.	   By	  way	  of	   the	   systems	  of	   financial	   analysis,	   companies	   are	   seen	   as	  
mathematical	  “models”	  of	  “value”.	  This	  cognitive	  framing	  conceals	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  social	  
relations	  involved	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  transaction.	  
	  
4.	  Calculating	  “value”	  to	  legitimise	  “value”	  
Nevertheless,	   although	   these	  models	   supposedly	   calculate	   an	   objective	   “value”,	   they	   are	  
actually	   only	   intermediate	   stages	   in	   establishing	   arguments	   for	   stating	   “the”	   value	   and	  
hence	   causing	   it	   to	   become	   accepted	   as	   objective	   and	   therefore	   legitimate.	   As	   was	  
highlighted	   by	   an	   investment	   banker,	   his	   work	   does	   not	   involve	   revealing	   an	   inherent	  
“value”,	  but	  rather	  “we	  don’t	  find	  the	  value,	  we	  optimise	  it!”	  Similarly,	  during	  the	  process	  of	  
valuation,	  analysts	  are	  given	  instructions	  by	  the	  client	  (investor)	  for	  whom	  they	  are	  working,	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and	   these	   instructions	   define	   the	   price	   that	  must	   be	   established	   by	   their	   calculations,	   as	  
shown	  in	  this	  extract	  from	  an	  interview	  with	  a	  young	  reporting	  accountant:	  
	  
“Normally	  we're	  supposed	  to	  be	  completely	  neutral,	  so	  we're	  not	  supposed	  to	  provide	  clients	  
with	  a	  certain	  figure	  just	  to	  keep	  them	  happy.	  (…)	  When	  clients...	  if	  we	  want	  to	  retain	  them,	  
we	  try	  to	  align	  ourselves	  with	  them	  (…).	  The	  client	  may	  say	  “maybe	  we	  could	  find	  something	  
[to	  shift	   the	  value]”.	  This	  has	  never	  happened	  to	  me	  yet,	   this	   feeling	  of	   influence	   from	  the	  
client.	  But	  I	  have	  already	  had	  the	  feeling	  of	  “well,	  that	  seems	  a	  little	  high,	  or	  a	  little	  low”.	  By	  
utilising	  very	  subtle	  conjectures,	  we	  are	  able	   to	  significantly	  alter	   the	  outcome.	  Even	   if	   the	  
process	  of	  deriving	  a	  valuation	  is	  based	  on	  a	  scientific	  method,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  lot	  of	  room	  for	  
interpretation.	   And	   depending	   on	   which	   conjecture	   is	   chosen,	   the	   results	   can	   be	   very	  
different...	  naturally.	  Since	  we	  never	  know	  what	  might	  happen	   in	  the	  future.	  So	  depending	  
on	   whether	   we	   use	   optimistic	   or	   pessimistic	   assumptions,	   this	   can	   change	   everything.	  
Especially	  when	  we're	   dealing	  with	   a	   start-­‐up	   company.	   You	   can	   imagine	   that	   in	   5	   years'	  
time,	  it	  could	  be	  Facebook,	  or	  it	  could	  no	  longer	  exist”.	  
	  
The	  work	  of	  these	  teams	  therefore	  involves	  “positioning	  the	  cursor	  where	  it	  is	  needed	  (the	  
price	  requested	  by	  the	  client)	  and	  rationalising	  accordingly”.	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  seller's	  
intermediaries	   will	   work	   to	   “make	   the	   bride	   seem	   beautiful”	   (to	   use	   an	   expression	   that	  
featured	   in	   many	   of	   the	   interviews),	   by	   choosing	   the	   figures	   that	   are	   in	   line	   with	  
expectations.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  buyer's	  intermediaries	  will	  try	  to	  downplay	  the	  processes	  that	  
inflate	  the	  “value”,	  and	  will	  rather	  compile	  and	  choose	  figures	  that	  decrease	  the	  “value”.	  
	  
“(With	  regards	  to	  due	  diligence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  sale),	  there	  is	  less	  independence	  since	  auditors	  
are	  then	  working	  for	  the	  seller.	  Auditing	  firms	  have	  to	  be	  dragged	  out	  kicking	  and	  screaming	  
in	  order	  to	  alleviate	  potential	  problem	  areas.	  But	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  buyer's	  due	  diligence,	  
the	   reports	   are	   also	   reviewed	   by	   the	   funds	   committee.	   For	   example,	   “highly	   pessimistic”	  
becomes	   “slightly	   pessimistic”.	   It's	   about	   the	   wording.	   It's	   the	   bride's	   dress.	  Marketing	   is	  
involved	   here,	   it	   plays	   an	   important	   role.	   The	   investment	   bank	   must	   depict	   the	   most	  
attractive	   (goal).	  But	  buyers	  aren't	   easily	  duped.	   They	  will	   carry	  out	   their	  own	  analysis.	   In	  




The	   process	   of	   constructing	   the	   “value”	   therefore	   has	   three	   stages,	   namely	   when	  
intermediaries	   canvass	   for	   clients,	  when	   there	  are	   compiled	   financial	   analysis	   reports	   and	  
valuation	  models,	  and	  finally	  when	  reputation	  reports	  are	  compared.	  In	  each	  case,	  it	  can	  be	  
seen	  that	  “value”	  is	  created	  by	  the	  systems	  in	  a	  series	  of	  three-­‐fold	  performativity	  in	  which	  
performativity	  of	  theory,	  belief	  and	  ranking	  system	  are	  logically	  connected.	  
	  
4.1.	  Intermediaries	  as	  traders	  of	  “value”	  
While	  investors	  may	  have	  their	  own	  ideas	  about	  the	  transactions	  that	  are	  to	  be	  conducted,	  
they	  are	  strongly	   influenced	  by	   intermediaries	  who	  suggest	   ideas	  to	  them.	   Intermediaries,	  
whose	  remuneration	  depends	  on	  the	  transactions	  they	  have	  conducted,	  envisage	  possible	  
transactions	  and	  suggest	  them	  to	  their	  client	  or	  future	  client.	  This	  involves	  them	  performing	  
calculations	   based	   on	   the	   figures	   they	   have	   available	   to	   them,	   through	   databases.	   These	  
calculations	  provide	  a	  measurement	  of	  the	  “value”	  that	  will	  be	  created	  were	  the	  transaction	  
to	  go	  ahead,	  along	  with	  the	  price	  of	  this	  transaction.	  The	  systems	  used	  (“the	  pitch”	  in	  which	  
the	  resulting	  values	  are	  presented	  and	  there	  is	  a	  discussion	  on	  “value	  creation”)	  act	  as	  a	  way	  
of	   conveying	   information	   to	   stimulate	   the	   interest	   of	   their	   clients.	   This	   process,	   which	   is	  
mainly	   for	   commercial	   purposes,	   is	   related	   to	   endorsement	   (Hatchuel,	   1995).	  On	   the	  one	  
hand,	   intermediaries	  use	  this	  process	  to	  disseminate	  their	  recommendations	   in	  relation	  to	  
the	   systems	   of	   measuring	   value.	   Intermediaries	   were	   also	   the	   ones	   responsible	   for	  
introducing	  the	  Discounted	  Cash	  Flow	  method	  and	  then	  making	   it	  an	  essential	  part	  of	   the	  
calculation.	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  also	  have	  the	  role	  of	  endorsing	  judgement	  (Karpik,	  
2007)	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  attach	  a	  “value”	  to	  companies	  and	  to	  the	  potential	  transactions.	  They	  
build	  a	   judgement	  on	   those	  companies	  or	  processes	   that	  have	  “value”,	  and	   those	   that	  do	  
not,	   hence	   categorising	   and	   forming	   ranking	   systems	   for	   the	   clients	   to	   whom	   they	   have	  
canvassed.	   This	   was	   the	   view	   expressed	   by	   the	   following	   investment	   banker,	   who	   is	   a	  
partner	  at	  a	  prestigious	  bank	  and	  whose	  team	  is	  well	  known:	  
“Anyone	  can	  come	  up	  with	  ideas	  (…)	  it's	  important	  to	  read	  the	  news,	  I	  meet	  people,	  I	  go	  to	  
trade	  fairs.	  Ideas	  are	  everywhere,	  it's	  up	  to	  you	  to	  catch	  hold	  of	  them.	  For	  example,	  when	  I	  
was	  on	  holiday	  (…),	  I	  came	  up	  with	  an	  idea	  about	  company	  A	  (that	  I	  could	  join	  with	  company	  
B...).	  When	  I	  came	  back	  from	  my	  holiday,	  I	  went	  to	  see	  X,	  the	  director	  of	  company	  B,	  he	  went	  
along	  with	  my	  idea	  and	  I	  sold	  it	  to	  a	  Private	  Equity	  fund.	  (…)	  But	  also,	  I	  had	  already	  heard	  X	  
say	  “Is	  there	  not	  any	  other	  business	  I	  could	  do”,	  and	  I	  came	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  and	  then	  did	  my	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research.	  This	  is	  where	  I	  was	  lucky.	  In	  company	  A,	  there	  was	  C	  (another	  large	  company),	  and	  
I	  didn't	  understand	  why	  it	  was	  there,	  since	  it	  wasn't	  part	  of	  their	  core	  business.	  So	  I	  went	  to	  
see	  them.	  I	  told	  them	  “I	  have	  an	  idea	  and	  a	  buyer,	  what	  do	  you	  think?”	  And	  they	  said	  yes,	  
but	  you	  don't	  sell	  at	  any	  old	  price.	  This	  is	  where	  my	  soap	  selling	  skills	  came	  in.	  I	  realised	  that	  I	  
had	  a	  feasible	  idea.	  As	  for	  the	  strategy,	  they	  must	  develop	  that.	  I	  went	  to	  see	  X,	  and	  he	  gave	  
me	  the	  purchase	  mandate.”	  
	  
Intermediaries	  therefore	  play	  a	  part	  in	  spreading	  the	  idea	  of	  “value	  creation”,	  using	  various	  
systems	  that	  reveal	  this	  value,	  which	  hence	  causes	  investors	  to	  take	  interest	  in	  the	  proposed	  
transactions	  and	  to	  perform	  them,	  within	   the	   frameworks	   that	  are	  provided	   in	   relation	  to	  
methodology	  and	  measurement.	   In	  this	  way,	  the	  “value”	  of	  the	  transaction	  and	  the	  ability	  
to	   perform	   this	   transaction	   come	   into	   existence,	   due	   to	   the	   very	   tools	   that	   measure	   it	  
(Callon,	  Muniesa,	  2010).	  
	  
4.2.	  A	  contingent	  value,	  depending	  on	  the	  analysis	  
	  
However,	  the	  final	  “value”	  of	  the	  transaction,	  which	  results	  from	  the	  price	  of	  the	  company,	  
is	   not	   set	   at	   this	   stage.	  At	   this	  point,	   the	   various	  due	  diligence	   reports	   are	  drawn	  up	  and	  
analysts	  “configure	  the	  models”.	  Each	  team	  of	  analysts	  produces	  its	  own	  accounting	  figures,	  
which	   will	   form	   the	   basis	   for	   calculating	   the	   three	   significant	   indicators	   previously	  
mentioned,	   as	   key	   variables	   in	   the	   valuation.	   This	   process	   involves	   auditing	   the	   balance	  
sheets,	  and	  the	  profit	  and	   loss	  account,	  as	  well	  as	  checking	   that	   the	  proposals	  outlined	   in	  
the	   business	   plan	   are	   sound.	   In	   this	   way,	   these	   experts	   in	   accounting	   are	   able	   to	   avoid	  
representing	  the	  truth	  of	  these	  accounts	  or	  of	  the	  company's	  situation	  (Gill,	  2009).	  
	  
“Nothing	   should	   be	   taken	   at	   face	   value.	   The	   information	  must	   be	   recompiled.	   Always	   dig	  
everywhere	  in	  all	  directions	  and	  obtain	  the	  most	  fair	  results”	  (a	  reporting	  accountant)	  
	  
During	  this	  stage	  there	  are	  fierce	  battles	  between	  experts,	  which	  are	  fought	  by	  analysts	  to	  
produce	  the	  figures	  that	  will	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  valuation.	  The	  figures	  that	  are	  shown	  in	  
the	  various	   reports	  are	  actually	   less	  down	  to	  objectivity	   (which	  cannot	  be	  achieved),	   than	  
the	  result	  of	  the	  battles	  and	  compromises	  made	  between	  analysts	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  various	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options	  on	  the	  figures	  and	  variables	  that	  are	  used.	  Indeed,	  these	  figures	  and	  variables	  form	  
the	  foundation	  for	  modelling	  the	  “value”	  of	  the	  company,	  in	  a	  circular	  process	  in	  which	  the	  
expected	   “value”	  may	   influence	   the	  data	   that	   is	   then	  used	   to	   calculate	   this	   very	   value.	   In	  
fact,	   analysts	   resort	   to	   numerous	   conjectures,	   themselves	   derived	   from	   a	   choice.	   For	  
example,	   in	   order	   to	   use	   the	  multiples	   approach,	   the	   sector	  multiple	  must	   be	   calculated	  
based	  on	  a	  sample	  of	  past	  transactions.	  Depending	  on	  the	  boundary	  adopted	  for	  the	  sector,	  
the	  time	  period	  and	  the	  transactions	  that	  are	   included	  or	  excluded,	  the	  multiple	  can	  vary.	  
The	  situation	  is	  even	  more	  extreme	  with	  DCF	  analysis,	  which	  requires	  future	  projections	  to	  
be	  made	  in	  relation	  to	  growth,	  a	  process	  that	  analysts	  maintain	  is	  “performed	  haphazardly”.	  
It	  may	   involve	   economic	   forecasts	   (turnover,	   etc.),	   as	   with	   finding	   the	   valuation	  multiple	  
when	  the	  sale	  is	  implemented.	  What	  is	  more,	  calculating	  the	  capital	  cost	  also	  depends	  on	  a	  
number	  of	  other	  variables,	  which	  themselves	  are	  a	  result	  of	  choice.	  In	  order	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  
“value”,	  analysts	  therefore	  make	  “sensitivity”	  assumptions	  based	  on	  probabilities	  assigned	  
to	  predicted	  events.	  Yet,	   in	  the	  end,	  as	  was	  stated	  by	  an	  intermediary	  “We	  sell	  companies	  
based	  on	  factors	  that	  are	  beyond	  our	  control.	  For	  example,	  we	  forecast	  what	  will	  happen	  10	  
years	  down	  the	  line,	  which	  is	  not	  actually	  possible	  to	  do.	  We	  sell	  certainty	  on	  false	  forecasts.	  
We	  are	  very	  far	  from	  the	  truth.”	  
As	  a	   result,	   for	  analysts,	   the	  whole	  point	  of	   the	  exercise	   is	  not	   to	   find	   the	   “truth”,	  but	   to	  
convince	  themselves,	  their	  teams,	  and	  other	  interested	  parties	  that	  their	  model	  is	  “the”	  true	  
model.	  
“We	   carry	   out	  modelling	   using	   variations	   in	   parameters.	   This	  materialises	   in	   line	  with	   the	  
sensitivity	   assumptions,	   and	   the	   effect	   this	   has	   on	   credit.	  We	   believe	   in	   it	   or	   we	   don't	  
believe	  in	  it”.	  (an	  intermediary).	  
	  
Therefore,	  there	  is	  initially	  a	  whole	  process	  of	  compromise	  and	  negotiations	  in	  teams	  and	  in	  
discussions	   with	   the	   client	   (buyer	   or	   seller),	   so	   as	   to	   set	   the	   potential	   value	   of	   the	  
transaction	  and	  hence	  estimate	  the	  price	  for	  which	  the	  company	  should	  be	  bought	  or	  sold.	  
Once	  each	  party	  has	  convinced	  itself	  of	  the	  “value”,	  it	  then	  tries	  to	  make	  the	  opposing	  party	  
“believe”	  in	  it.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  rationalising	  it	  through	  using	  authenticated	  figures	  and	  making	  
expert	  use	  of	  the	  methods.	  This	  corresponds	  with	  the	  following	  explanation	  given	  by	  a	  tutor	  
to	   justify	   the	   valuation	   of	   a	   company	   to	   Chief	   Financial	   Officers,	   whose	   companies	   were	  
going	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  takeovers	  with	  investment	  funds:	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“Here	  are	   some	  basic,	   common-­‐sense	   ideas:	   once	   you	  have	   completed	   the	   evaluation	  and	  
you	  obtain	  a	  figure	  (...),	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  and	  uphold	  the	  conclusion	  drawn,	  as	  
well	   as	   justify	   the	   final	   evaluation	   (...)	   An	   evaluation	   (…)	   is	   sensitive	   to	   modifications	   in	  
various	  parameters.	  And	  to	  sensitivity	  analysis	  too...so	  it's	  like	  I	  told	  you:	  feel	  free	  to	  imagine	  
scenarios.	  Scenarios	  that	  may	  be	  meaningful	  to	  the	  people	  to	  whom	  you	  are	  presenting	  the	  
operation.	  As	  such,	  you	  must	  think	  about	  who	  you	  are	  addressing,	  in	  what	  state	  of	  mind	  they	  
want	  to	  be	  when	  the	  information	  reaches	  them,	  and	  what	  interests	  them”.	  
This	  same	  view	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  following	  exchange	  between	  a	  seller	  (represented	  by	  the	  
Chief	  Financial	  Officer)	  and	  his	  reporting	  accountant	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  drawing	  up	  the	  
due	   diligence	   report.	   In	   this	   case,	   it	   involves	   presenting	   a	   report	  which	  will	   convince	   the	  
banks	  that	  are	  supporting	  it,	  with	  the	  amount	  and	  rate	  of	  this	  report	  determining	  the	  final	  
“value”	   of	   the	   transaction	   (since	   the	   financial	   leverage	   effect	   automatically	   increases	   the	  
ultimate	  capital	  gain).	  
Chief	  Financial	  Officer:	  “The	  shareholder	  wishes	  the	  modified	  EBITDA	  to	  be	  added	  under	  the	  
table	  and	  that	  the	  change	  in	  value	  is	  added	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  making	  calculations	  ourselves.	  
He	  feels	  uneasy,	  since	   if	  we	  say	  that	  we	  are	  being	  careful	   in	  the	  current	  context,	   they	  (the	  
banks)	  will	  think	  there's	  a	  problem.	  The	  shareholder	  simply	  wants	  us	  to	  provide	  no	  reason;	  
this	  way,	  bankers	  aren't	  given	  leads	  that	  may	  cause	  them	  to	  worry”.	  
The	  reporting	  accountant	  takes	  note	  of	  this	  and	  says	  “OK”.	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   these	   various	   rationalisations	  will	   themselves	   come	   into	   conflict	   during	   the	  
“Question	   and	  Answer”	   sessions	   in	  which	   the	   buyer's	   reporting	   accountants	   question	   the	  
seller's	   reporting	   accountants	   about	   the	   report	   that	   they	   have	   compiled.	   During	   these	  
heated	  debates,	  which	  occur	  publicly	  (in	  the	  presence	  of	  buyers,	  sellers,	  intermediaries	  and	  
lenders),	  reporting	  accountant's	  analysts	  risk	  their	  professional	  reputation.	  Regarding	  what	  
is	   at	   stake	   in	   these	   “Question	   and	   Answer”	   sessions,	   one	   reporting	   accountant	   gave	   the	  
following	   explanation:	   “the	   risk	   is	   to	   ask	   too	   many	   questions	   and	   stupid	   questions.	   One	  
question	  is	  OK	  and	  so	  is	  two,	  but	  three	  is	  not.	  A	  question	  is	  stupid	  when	  you	  ask	  the	  question	  
and,	   (sitting	   opposite),	   they	   think	   'this	   person	   doesn't	   know	   a	   thing	   about	   business'.”	  
Another	   reporting	  accountant	  added	  “In	  Q&A,	   it's	  a	  question	  of	  eloquence.	  You	  may	  have	  
made	  a	  mistake,	  but	  you	  must	  not	  show	  it.”	  At	  the	  end	  of	  “Question	  and	  Answer”	  sessions,	  
the	  teams,	  facing	  their	  client	  (buyer	  or	  seller	  accordingly),	  comment	  on	  the	  remarks	  made	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by	  the	  opposing	  teams,	  as	  in	  the	  following	  example	  in	  which	  the	  head	  of	  the	  seller's	  team	  of	  
reporting	  accountants	   is	  referring	  to	  his	  counterpart	  on	  the	  buyer’s	  side,	  saying	  “Given	  his	  
status	  (the	  reporting	  accountant	  is	  a	  partner	  in	  a	  leading	  firm),	  I	  did	  not	  understand	  why	  he	  
did	  not	  ask	  questions	  of	  a	  more	  qualitative	  nature	  from	  the	  start”.	  
	  
The	  questions	  asked	  on	  the	  one	  side	  as	  with	  the	  answers	  provided	  on	  the	  other	  either	  lend	  
credibility	   to	   the	   proposed	   figures,	   or	   undermine	   their	   credibility.	   These	   questions	   and	  
answers	  also	  gradually	  establish	  an	  acceptable	  version	  of	  these	  figures.	  They	  set	  up	  the	  final	  
stages	  of	  negotiation,	  by	  attempting	  to	  weaken	  the	  arguments	  and	  figures	  of	  the	  opposing	  
party.	  As	  such,	  the	  teams	  regularly	  make	  comments	  about	  the	  documents	  compiled	  by	  the	  
opposing	  teams	  in	  the	  transaction,	  with	  these	  comments	  relying	  on	  their	  own	  judgement	  of	  
the	  “value”,	  which	  they	  form	  by	  evaluating	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  arguments	  on	  all	  sides.	  For	  
example,	  before	  a	  business	  meeting	  with	  reporting	  accountants	  of	  the	  TAS	  consulting	  firm	  
that	   he	   selected,	   one	   of	   the	   investors	   in	   Private	   Equity	   funds	   commented	   on	   the	   due	  
diligence	   report	   drawn	   up	   by	   the	   seller's	   reporting	   accountants,	   the	   GC	   firm:	   “I	   do	   not	  
understand	  anything	  about	  the	  report	  compiled	  by	  CG.	  I	  do	  not	  know	  what	  this	  company	  is.	  
It's	  very	  financial”.	  The	  reporting	  accountant,	  head	  of	  the	  TAS	  team,	  added	  “It's	  very	  much	  a	  
'helicopter	   view'.	   All	   the	   same,	   some	   of	   it	   is	   phrased	   in	   a	   surprising	   way	   (he	   reads	   and	  
laughs).	   I	   agree	   with	   your	   comments:	   what	   is	   this	   business?”	   The	   two	   other	   reporting	  
accountants	  from	  TAS	  and	  the	  second	  investor	   in	  Private	  Equity	  funds	  also	  gave	  their	  own	  
criticisms	  of	  the	  document:	  “not	  easy	  to	  read”,	  “tiring”,	  “it	  took	  me	  a	  while	  to	  actually	  find	  
the	  figures”.	  This	  discussion	  is	  based	  on	  the	  view	  that	  investor,	  who	  in	  this	  case	  is	  the	  buyer,	  
establish	  their	  own	  value,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  defend	  this	  value	  during	  the	  
negotiation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  
	  
	  
4.3.	  Reputation	  reports	  as	  central	  to	  defining	  the	  “market	  value”	  
Nevertheless,	   there	   could	   not	   be	   a	   “value”	   constructed	   by	   the	   systems	   without	   it	   being	  
reinforced	   by	   a	   certain	   belief,	   not	   so	   much	   in	   the	   systems	   themselves	   but	   rather	   in	   the	  
knowledge	   and	   professional	   legitimacy	   of	   those	   who	   use	   these	   systems	   (DiMaggio	   and	  
Powell,	  1983).	  Indeed,	  given	  that	  each	  method	  may	  produce	  various	  “values”	  and	  the	  three	  
methods	  may	  produce	  different	  results,	  the	  systems	  alone	  do	  not	  express	  the	  “value”.	  These	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systems	  are	  handled	  by	  different	  analysts	  and	  the	  message	  conveyed	  by	  the	  systems	  is	  only	  
worth	  as	  much	  as	   the	  “value”	  of	   the	  message	  conveyed.	   In	  order	   to	  understand	   this,	   it	   is	  
necessary	  to	  look	  back	  at	  the	  stage	  when	  the	  price	  is	  negotiated,	  which	  is	  when	  the	  buyer's	  
bids	  and	  the	  seller's	  expectations	  come	  into	  conflict.	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  expressing	  the	  transaction	  in	  figures	  and	  values	  using	  the	  systems,	  buyers	  rely	  
on	  the	  reputation	  of	  their	  chosen	  intermediaries	  to	  draw	  interest	  from	  their	  managers	  and	  
financial	   backers,	   and	   to	   influence	   the	   opposing	   party.	   For	   an	   investor,	   who	   is	   leading	   a	  
proposed	   transaction,	   paying	   for	   the	   services	   of	   a	   “big	   name	   in	   the	   financial	   sector”	  
increases	  their	  chances	  of	  persuading	  others.	  
“Investment	  banks	  are	  used	  when	   it	   is	  a	  major	   transaction	   that	   requires	  a	  guarantee;	  you	  
pay	  for	  the	  name”	  (Chief	  Financial	  Officer	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  mergers	  and	  acquisition	  in	  a	  
branch	  of	  CAC	  4014)	  
	  
Indeed,	   different	   intermediaries	   are	  not	   equal	   in	   terms	  of	   their	   reputation	   and	   thus	   their	  
ability	   to	   state	  “the	  value”.	   	   Intermediaries,	   for	  example,	  are	  classed	  according	   to	   ranking	  
systems,	   which	   rate	   investment	   banks.	   This	   rating	   is	   formalised	   in	   being	   published	   by	  
various	   establishments	   that	   produce	   ranking	   systems,	   known	   as	   “league	   tables”.	  
Alternatively,	  prizes	  and	  trophies	  are	  awarded	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  “best”	  investment	  banks	  
for	  each	  category	  of	  transaction.	  
“Investment	  banks	  are	  proud	  of	  these	  ranking	  systems,	  and	  so	  refer	  you	  to	  them.	  That's	  the	  
system	  of	  league	  tables.	  There	  are	  sub-­‐categories;	  if	  a	  bank	  appears	  in	  both	  ranking	  systems,	  
this	   is	  not	  down	  to	  chance.	  They	  really	  must	  be	  good	  (…).	  There	  are	  the	  “fat	  cats”	  who	  are	  
ranked	   in	   first	   place	   for	   all	   the	   categories,	   and	   they	   think	   they	   can	   just	   call	   their	   boss	   [to	  
suggest	   a	   transaction],	   and	   sometimes	   this	   works.”	   (A	   Chief	   Financial	   Officer	   who	   is	  
responsible	  for	  the	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  of	  a	  branch	  of	  CAC	  40).	  
	  
Yet	   these	   reputations	   are	   also	   informal	   and	   personal,	   and	   they	   are	   disseminated	   in	   the	  
“small	   world”	   (indigenous	   expression).	   Generally	   speaking,	   reputation	   depends	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  b “CAC” stands for “Cotation Assistée en Continu” meaning “Continuous Assisted Quotation”. It is a benchmark 




number	   of	   completed	   transactions,	   “deals”,	   in	   addition	   to	   how	  much	   these	   transactions	  
were	  worth,	  as	  is	  suggested	  in	  the	  following	  assessment	  of	  various	  intermediaries	  made	  by	  	  
____________________	  
 
an	  investor	  in	  Private	  Equity	  funds:	  
“There	   is	  PwC	  (PricewaterhouseCoopers),	  which	  will	  be	  head	  and	  shoulders	  above	  the	  rest.	  
And	   those	   having	   formerly	   collaborated	  with	   Ernst	   and	   Young,	   who	   have	   now	   celebrated	  
their	   150th	   anniversary,	   and	  who	  were	   financed	   by	   a	   head	   of	   a	   LBO.	   It	   is	   ranked	   8	   for	   its	  
advisory	  role.	  As	  for	  tax	  consultants	  and	   lawyers,	  who	  are	   individuals,	  there	  are	  some	  very	  
good	  ones.	  There	  is	  a	   list	  of	  recognised	  names.	  And	  they	  must	  be	  able	  to	  execute	  tasks.	  As	  
for	   investment	   bankers,	   (…),	   at	   Rothschild,	   there	  was	   one	   person	   in	   particular	  who	   had	   a	  
phenomenal	  market	  share”	  (an	  investor	  in	  Private	  Equity	  funds)	  
	  
However	  someone’s	  reputation	  also	  relates	  to	  how	  reliable	  they	  are	  and	  whether	  they	  are	  
able	  to	  prove	  their	  expertise,	  as	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  term	  “credibility”,	  which	  is	  widely	  used	  
in	   the	   interviews.	   The	   forming	   of	   these	   judgements	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   framework	   of	  
everyday	  interactions.	  For	  example,	  while	  observing	  a	  conference	  call	  about	  a	  transaction,	  it	  
was	  noted	  that	  the	  team	  of	  reporting	  accountants	  gathered	  around	  the	  telephone	  had	  the	  
chance	  to	  discuss	  intermediaries	  who	  they	  had	  encountered	  in	  previous	  transactions:	  “Oh!	  
That’s	   Leonardo’s	   famous	   team!”	   or	   “There	   are	   two	   people	   from	   Barclays,	   they	   weren’t	  
bad.”	  
	  
Reputation	   is	  also	  maintained	  and	  propagated	  by	   the	  press	  and	  professional	  networks.	  As	  
such,	  some	  bankers	  are	  real	  “stars”	  of	  their	  field	  and	  become	  very	  on-­‐trend,	  as	  shown	  in	  an	  
article	   from	  La	  Tribune15	   in	   2010,	   entitled	   “the	   rising	   stars	  of	   investment	  banking”,	  which	  
listed	  the	  names	  of	  “the	  young	  forty-­‐somethings	  who	  have	  spent	  their	  entire	  career	  in	  major	  
banks,	   such	  as	  Morgan	  Stanley,	   J.P.	  Morgan,	  Lazard	  or	  Rothschild”	  and	  who	  are	  “ready	   to	  
inherit	  the	  title”.	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These	  reputations,	  and	  especially	   the	  way	  they	  are	  differentiated	  and	  ranked,	  plays	  a	  role	  
during	   the	   final	   stages	   of	   negotiating	   the	   price.	   Indeed	   “the	   value”	   presented	   by	   a	   “big	  
name”	  based	  on	  due	  diligence	  reports	  compiled	  by	  a	  firm	  involved	  in	  the	  “best	  deals”	  in	  
that	  area,	  conducted	  by	  people	  whose	  “credibility”	  is	  widely	  accepted,	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
adopted	   during	   the	   final	   stages	   of	   negotiation.	   Therefore,	   bankers	   who	   are	   known	   for	  
having	   successfully	   negotiated	   a	   deal	   for	   their	   client	   “thanks	   to	   their	   talent”,	   are	   sought-­‐
after	  figures	  to	  play	  an	  influential	  role	  when	  the	  price	  is	  settled.	  	  
“We're	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  very	  expensive	  lawyer,	  or	  an	  investment	  banker.	  But	  it's	  the	  man	  
that	   counts.	  Here's	  an	  example:	  Picard	  was	   sold	   in	   the	   summer	  of	  2010,	   from	  one	  Private	  
Equity	  firm	  to	  another.	  By	  Friday,	  three	  bids	  were	  on	  the	  table,	  one	  of	  which	  was	  10%	  higher	  
than	  the	  others.	  For	  the	  seller,	  this	  is	  good.	  He	  knows	  who	  he	  will	  choose.	  The	  banker	  has	  the	  
sale	  mandate.	  He	  plays	  a	  significant	  role.	  His	  name	  is	  Laurent	  Baril.	  Everyone	  knows	  him.	  He	  
is	  managing	  director	  at	  Rothschild.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  weekend,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  convince	  
the	  bidder	  who	  had	  offered	  10%	  above	  the	  others	  to	  increase	  his	  price	  even	  higher.	  And	  over	  
the	  weekend,	  the	  price	  increased	  by	  150	  million	  Euros.	  150	  million	  Euros	  are	  thrown	  onto	  the	  
deal	  just	  like	  that.	  Bang!	  When	  you're	  the	  seller,	  and	  you	  know	  you	  have	  someone	  who	  can	  
dramatically	   alter	   the	   price,	   you're	   willing	   to	   pay	   a	   lot	   of	  money”	   (an	   investor	   in	   Private	  
Equity	  funds).	  
The	   stories	   that	   are	   disseminated	   about	   negotiations	   expose	   power	   relations,	   acts	   of	  
intimidation,	   wars	   of	   attrition	   and	   nerves,	   which	   result	   in	   confirmed	   reputations	   being	  
established	   for	   future	  negotiations:	  “You	   cannot	   simultaneously	  be	   competitive	  and	  good-­‐
natured.	  You	  should	  earn	  others'	  respect	  during	  the	  sale,	  rather	  than	  be	  duped	  by	  them”	  (an	  
investor	  in	  Private	  Equity	  funds).	  
However,	   what	   is	   particularly	   noticeable	   is	   that	   for	   all	   transactions,	   buyers	   and	   sellers	  
employ	   the	   services	   of	   groups	   of	   intermediaries	   who	   are	   part	   of	   the	   same	   circle	  
(demarcated	   by	   the	   ranking	   systems	   and	   the	   ratings	   of	   the	   sector).	   If	   the	   opposite	  were	  
true,	   it	   is	   more	   than	   likely	   that	   the	   outcome	   of	   negotiations	   would	   favour	   the	   most	  
prestigious	  company.	  This	  stage	  of	  negotiation	  has	  a	  performative	  side	  to	  it,	  when	  ranking	  
systems	  are	  applied	  (Espeland	  and	  Sauder,	  2007).	  The	  companies	  or	  analysts	  with	  the	  best	  
rating	  are	  therefore	  entrusted	  with	  the	  major	  transactions	  and	  are	  believed	  by	  those	  in	  their	  
field	  as	  providing	  the	  “correct”	  value.	  As	  such,	  they	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  remain	  highly	  rated	  and	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to	   be	   leading	   players	   with	   regards	   to	   “value”,	   to	   paraphrase	   the	   name	   of	   these	   ranking	  
systems.	  
	  
5.	  Using	  the	  valuation	  systems	  as	  a	  professional	  art	  
Analysts,	   who	   are	   intermediaries	   in	   the	   processes	   of	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions,	   are	  
essentially	   market	   intermediaries,	   as	   defined	   in	   economic	   sociology.	   They	   contribute	  
towards	   creating	   the	   market	   by	   developing	   products	   that	   comprise	   the	   transactions	  
themselves,	  the	  “value”	  that	  this	  supposedly	  generates,	  but	  also,	  for	  the	  price	  of	  the	  traded	  
products,	   endowing	   companies	   with	   a	   performative	   aspect.	   The	   systems,	   through	   the	  
theories	   about	   value	   that	   they	   incorporate,	   the	   calculations	   that	   they	   perform,	   and	   the	  
reputations	   of	   the	   analysts	   who	   handle	   them,	   are	   central	   to	   this	   performative	   effect.	  
Understanding	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  effect	  also	  requires	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
these	   systems	   are	   disseminated	   and	   the	   professional	   space	   that	   is	   consequently	  
demarcated.	  
	  
5.1.	  	   	  Multilaterally	  and	  homogeneously	  endorsing	  valuation	  systems	  
Intermediaries,	   in	   their	   commercial	   capacity,	  endorse	   to	   their	   clients	   the	  use	  of	  particular	  
systems	  for	  measuring	  “value”.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  process	  of	  endorsing	  also	  takes	  place	  on	  
other	  levels,	  each	  of	  which	  reinforces	  the	  others.	  For	  example,	  firms	  of	  intermediaries	  and	  
reporting	   accountants	   hire	   as	   analysts,	   those	   graduates	   of	   grandes	   écoles	   specialised	   in	  
business	   or	   engineering	   (or	   the	   international	   equivalent),	   whose	   studies	   have	   included	  
topics	   focussed	   on	   finance	   that	   are	   taught	   at	   these	   écoles	   and	   particularly	   in	   corporate	  
finance.	   This	   teaching	   is	   based	   on	   American	   and	   French	   publications,	  written	   by	   teacher-­‐
researchers,	  consultants	  or	  both,	  which	  act	  as	  manuals	  and	  reference	  material16. They	  are	  
based	   on	   different	   methods	   of	   financial	   analysis	   (through	   learning	   about	   financial	   and	  
accounting	  categories,	  and	  interpreting	  ratios),	  and	  the	  valuation	  methods.	  The	  underlying	  
theory	  is	  that	  of	  “value	  creation	  for	  the	  shareholder”.	  Teaching	  is	  mainly	  conducted	  through	  
the	  case	  method,	   in	  other	  words	   learning	  through	  exercises	  taken	  from	  real-­‐life	  situations	  
experienced	   by	   companies.	   This	   deals	   with	   analytical	   systems	   and	  measurement	   systems	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




taught	   in	   manuals,	   as	   indicated	   by	   a	   tutor	   during	   a	   training	   session	   that	   dealt	   with	   the	  
valuation	  of	  a	  company:	  
“The	  tutor:	   In	  books,	  we	  cover	  methods	   in	  some	  detail,	  while	  ensuring	  the	  calculations	  are	  
fully	  grasped.	  Once	  the	  parts	  on	  the	   influence	  of	  accounting	  and	  value	  creation	  have	  been	  
covered,	   it	  (the	  books)	  won't	  be	  of	  any	  more	  use,	   in	  theoretical	  terms	  that	   is.	  So	  this	   is	  the	  
chance	   to	   apply	   the	   theory	   to	   practice	   and	   to	   discuss	   it,	   which	   is	   more	   important	   in	   my	  
view...	  (Then,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  exercise	  that	  they	  are	  doing)	  Have	  you	  managed	  to	  calculate	  
the	   weighted	   average	   costs	   of	   capital	   (WACC)	   or	   are	   you	   still	   working	   on	   the	   costs	   of	  
equity?”	  
	  
This	  same	  training	  can	  be	  found	  in	  all	  continuous	  professional	  development	  programmes	  on	  
offer,	  whether	   they	  be	   for	   financial	   intermediaries	  or	   their	  clients.	  For	  example,	  American	  
investment	  banks	  provide	  new	  employees	  with	   training	   that	   lasts	   several	  weeks,	   covering	  
financial	   analysis	   and	   valuation;	   this	   training	   is	   subcontracted	   to	   specialised	   groups	   that	  
provide	   their	   services	   to	   several	  banks.	  An	   investment	  banker	  who	  had	  gone	   through	   this	  
training	  neatly	  put	   it:	  “this	   is	  when	  we	  get	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  tool	  kit”,	  the	  fixed	  foundation	  
that	  is	  essential	  to	  doing	  this	  job.	  
Yet	  this	  foundation	  is	  also	  presented	  (admittedly	  in	  a	  less	  intensive	  timetable)	  to	  company	  
directors	   or	   Chief	   Financial	   Officers,	   as	   training	   provided	   by	   professional	   organisations,	  
management	  schools	  or	  private	  establishments	  (Cegos,	  …).	  
What	   is	  more,	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	   intermediaries	  make	  the	  choice	  of	  analysts	  during	  
the	   recruitment	   process	   by	   giving	   candidates	   the	   task	   of	   handling	   scenarios	   involving	  
financial	   analysis	   and	   valuation.	   Both	   their	   ability	   to	   manipulate	   the	   “tool	   kit”	   and	   their	  
financial	  reasoning	  behind	  “value	  creation”	  play	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  this	  recruitment	  process.	  
Ultimately,	   through	   various	   actors	   (universities,	   écoles,	   continuous	   professional	  
development	   programmes,	   consultants,	   M&A	   intermediaries),	   these	   systems	   are	  
multilaterally	  endorsed,	  in	  areas	  ranging	  from	  the	  vast	  sector	  of	  management	  to	  the	  much	  
narrower	  sector	  of	  finance,	  resulting	  in	  the	  systems	  for	  measuring	  the	  legitimate	  “value”	  (at	  
a	  given	  time)	  being	  homogenised.	  
	  
5.2.	  The	  “deal”	  as	  a	  professional	  work	  of	  art	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Multilaterally	   and	   uniformly	   endorsing	   the	   systems	   in	   this	   way,	   causes	   them	   to	   be	  
disseminated	   in	   numerous	   directions.	   It	   also	   plays	   a	   part	   in	   creating	   a	   world	   that	   is	  
structured	  around	  these	  systems	  and	  what	  they	  stand	  for	  as	  shared	  conventions,	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	   way	   of	   representing,	   analysing	   and	   valuing	   a	   company.	   This	   reinforces	   the	   idea	   that	  
these	  systems	   result	   from	  “formal	   investments”	   (Thévenot,	  1985),	   for	  which	   the	  cognitive	  
dimension	  allows	  actions	  to	  be	  co-­‐ordinated	  within	  the	  social	  space	  that	  accepts	  and	  uses	  
them.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  second	  dimension,	  working	  alongside	  the	  first	  one,	  which	  
emerges	  as	   these	   systems	  are	  used.	  As	  has	  already	  been	   seen	  when	   the	  work	  of	  analysts	  
was	  described,	  financial	  categories	  are	  ways	  of	  representing	  the	  company,	  but	  also	  ways	  of	  
considering	  the	  processes	  of	  acting	  upon	  this	  company,	  using	  axiological	  categories.	  Indeed,	  
the	  systems	  also	  introduce	  a	  set	  of	  guiding	  principles	  and	  justifications	  for	  these,	  all	  of	  which	  
are	   rooted	   in	   the	   financial	   theory	  of	   “value	   for	   the	   shareholder”.	   This	   set	   of	   principles	  or	  
Logos	  means	  that	   the	  company	   is	  not	  a	   tool	   for	  producing	  commodities	   to	  be	  sold	  on	  the	  
market,	  but	  rather	  is	  a	  commodity	  itself,	  which	  can	  be	  traded	  on	  a	  market.	  
“(Value	  creation	  for	  Private	  Equity	  funds)	  relies	  on	  the	  results,	  the	  EBITDA,	  which	  rises	  and	  
falls.	   Everything	   hinges	   on	   the	   EBITDA.	   The	   increase	   in	   EBITDA	   is	  what	   counts	   (…).	   If	   you	  
manage	  to	  buy	  (the	  company),	  for	  a	  reasonable	  price,	  and	  you	  convert	  it	  into	  nuggets	  that	  
everyone	  fights	  over…”	  (A	  Private	  Equity	  investor)	  
“Investment	   funds	   have	   filled	   a	   void;	   this	   has	   created	   a	   secondary	   market.	   This	   allows	  
directors	   to	   remain	   as	   directors	   and	   to	   liquidate	   part	   of	   the	   capital	   (which	   otherwise	   is	   a	  
dangerous	   thing	   to	   do)	   and	   the	   capital	   can	   breathe.	   (…)The	   important	   thing	   is	  where	   the	  
capital	   is	   located	   (…).	  Capital	   that	  does	  not	  breathe,	   that	   is	   fixed	   in	  place.	  The	  company	   is	  
dead	  (…).	  The	  capital	  must	  be	  given	  fresh	  air,	  it	  should	  change	  hands.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  capital	  
changes	   hands,	   this	   allows	   for	   my	   modest	   team	   to	   get	   involved.	   After	   I’ve	   got	   involved,	  
things	  improve	  greatly	  for	  the	  company,	  since	  the	  capital	  has	  been	  suitably	  located	  and	  we	  
are	  going	   to	  make	   sound	  decisions;	   this	   is	  because	   the	   capital	  has	  been	  cleaned	  and	  not	  
because	  we	  stepped	  in	  with	  the	  management”	  (An	  intermediary,	  investment	  banker).	  
	  
As	  a	  result,	  together	  with	  the	  systems,	  this	  Logos	  is	  also	  disseminated,	  particularly	  through	  
intermediaries	   in	  transactions,	  as	  this	  gathers	  people	  who	  are	  the	  most	  highly	  trained	  and	  
handpicked	   for	   these	   systems,	   as	   well	   as	   being	   the	   ones	   who	   most	   regularly	   use	   these	  
systems	   in	   their	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  work.	   	   This	   Logos,	   combined	  with	   the	   systems	   that	   structure	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analysts’	   work	   as	   a	   game	   of	   abstract,	   intellectual	   modelling,	   produces	   both	   moral	   and	  
professional	  categories	  as	  ways	  of	  understanding	  the	  composition	  of	  this	  work.	  The	  model	  
for	   a	   “good	   professional”	   emerging	   from	   interviews	   and	   observations	   alike,	   is	   someone	  
whose	  high	  degree	  of	  expertise	  enables	   the	  person	   to	  perform	   the	  expected	   tasks,	  which	  
are	  that	  of	  numerous,	  good	  quality	  transactions,	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  complex	  and	  of	  significant	  
scope.	  
“The	  thing	   I	   like	   is	  working	  on	  major	  deals.	   It’s	  enjoyable.	   It's	  glamorous.	  For	  example,	  the	  
acquisition	  of	  Sigram	  by	  Pernod-­‐Ricard	  or	  the	  acquisition	  of	  Orange	  by	  France	  Telecom(...).	  I	  
would	  come	  out	  of	  our	  offices,	  and	  all	  around	  there	  was	  excitement	  and	  energy	  relating	  to	  
the	  deal,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  things	  that	  really	  drives	  you	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  job.	  And	  while	  I	  was	  
learning	  the	  technical	  elements	  from	  a	  team,	  the	  atmosphere	  was	  overwhelming,	  since	  we	  
were	   contributing	   towards	   major	   deals”	   (A	   Private	   Equity	   investor,	   talking	   about	   his	  
experience	  as	  a	  lender)	  
	  
“Making	   (or	   taking	   part	   in)	   a	   deal”,	  as	   it	   is	   referred	   to	   in	   indigenous	   language,	   therefore	  
constitutes	   the	   professional	   work	   of	   art	   as	   defined	   by	   H.	   Becker	   (1988).	   It	   is	   the	   guiding	  
principle	  for	  all	  work	  and	  career	  paths,	  and	   is	  combined	  with	  peer	  recognition,	  both	  as	  an	  
informal	   reputation	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   an	   official	   rank	   in	   league	   tables	   on	   the	   other.	  
Through	   this,	   there	   becomes	   evident	   another	   performative	   effect	   of	   the	   systems,	   namely	  
that	  by	   feeding	  a	  model	  of	  professionalism	  which	   is	  based	  on	  accomplishing	   transactions,	  
those	  who	  identify	  with	  it	  begin	  to	  construe	  a	  potential	  “deal”	   in	  every	  company.	  As	  such,	  
they	  create	  in	  their	  own	  way,	  a	  market	  for	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions.	  The	  following	  provides	  
the	  description	  given	  by	  several	  analysts	  regarding	  the	  dramatic	  growth	  of	  the	  mergers	  and	  
acquisitions	  market	  that	  culminated	  in	  2007.	  Teams	  of	  investors	  (especially	  those	  in	  Private	  
Equity),	  intermediaries,	  reporting	  accountants	  and	  lenders,	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  remain	  at	  the	  top	  of	  
professional	  ranking	  systems	  or	  simply	  to	  receive	  recognition	  from	  their	  team,	  company	  or	  
field,	   attempted	   “at	   all	   costs”	   to	   accomplish	   deals,	   using	   the	   systems	   for	   measuring	   the	  
“value”	   in	   order	   to	   convince	   themselves	   and,	   convince	   others	   how	   appropriate	   these	  
systems	   were,	   all	   by	   professionally	   imitating	   others	   without	   facing	   oppositional	   views	  
(DiMaggio	  and	  Powell,	  1983).	  
“In	  2007,	  deals	  became	  increasingly	  aggressive.	  The	  bank's	  philosophy	  was	  to	  be	  selective,	  
but	  to	  sell	  (loans).	  It	  is	  essential	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  market	  (remain	  in	  the	  league	  tables).	  (…)	  (The	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bank)	  tells	  us:	  choose	  assets	  that	  you	  believe	  in	  (…).	  So	  we	  tried	  to	  do	  just	  that	  (…).	  We	  used	  
Excel	   and	   it	  was	   important	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   business	  would	   grow	   (together)	  with	   its	  
valuation.	   There	   was	   a	   lot	   of	   structuring	   carried	   out	   by	   banks,	   which	   involved	   very	  
aggressive	  young	  people	  and	  in	  which	  it	  was	  essential	  that	  deals	  were	  made.	  Based	  on	  Excel.	  
It's	  a	  bubble.	  You	  were	  establishing	  things	  that	  the	  market	  (investors	  and	  competitors)	  were	  
willing	  to	  accept	  even	  if	  you	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  it	  yourself.	  You	  were	  giving	  the	  market	  what	  
it	  wanted	  (leverage	  effects	  that	  would	  grow	  continually)	   (…)	  Analysts	  would	  ask	  questions,	  
but	   the	   real	   question	  was	   “isn't	   that	   little	   guy	   next	   to	  me	   going	   to	   offer	   something	  more	  
aggressive?”	   (…)	   And	   others	   (analysts)	   would	   think:	   their	   story	   is	   believable	   (the	   business	  
plan	  and	  the	  values	  presented	  by	   the	  companies	  who	  are	   to	  be	   financed).	  They	  believed	   it	  
would	   work...	   It's	   the	   financial	   bubble:	   you're	   in	   the	   bubble.	   Together	   we	   believe	   that	  
business	  plans	  will	  grow”	  (A	  lender,	  specialised	  in	  financing	  Private	  Equity	  funds).	  
	  
This	  principle,	  which	  took	  hold	  during	  a	  period	  when	  liquid	  assets	  (equity	  and	  funding)	  were	  
readily	  available,	  caused	  the	  price	  of	  transactions	  to	  increase;	  when	  the	  values	  assigned	  to	  
transactions	   were	   calculated	   as	   very	   high,	   this	   resulted	   in	   higher	   selling	   prices,	   in	   an	  
environment	  in	  which	  teams	  of	  investors	  were	  competing.	  What	  is	  more,	  these	  high	  prices	  
automatically	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  valuation	  multiples.	  In	  turn,	  given	  the	  multiples	  approach	  
and	  DCF	  analysis	  (which	  forecasts	  a	  long-­‐term	  multiple)	  that	  are	  used	  to	  measure	  value	  for	  
the	  following	  transactions,	  this	  caused,	  on	  average,	  a	  continuous	  increase	  in	  prices	  until	  the	  
financial	  crisis	  in	  2008.	  
	  
5.3.	  The	  boundaries	  of	  “value	  creation”	  
As	  a	  result,	  disseminating	  these	  systems	  for	  measuring	  value	  creates	  a	  social	  space	  in	  which	  
there	   are	   shared	  both	   the	   cognitive	   tools	   that	   facilitate	   joint	   action,	   and	   the	  professional	  
categories	   that	  define	  a	  good	  worker.	  Once	  again,	   this	  presents	   the	   idea	  of	  a	  social	  world	  
shaped	  by	  a	  professional	  universe,	  as	  formally	  defined	  by	  H.	  Becker	  in	  relation	  to	  art	  worlds	  
(1988).	   The	   boundaries	   of	   this	   professional	   group	   (Abbott,	   1988)	   also	   demarcate	   the	  
boundaries	  of	  “value	  creation”.	  The	  intermediaries	  encountered	  all	  say	  they	  enjoy	  working	  
with	   “professional”	   clients,	   in	   that	   they	   share	   the	   same	   conventions	   and	   the	   same	  
professional	  model.	   These	  particular	   clients	  are	   investors	   in	  Private	  Equity	   funds,	   the	  vast	  
majority	   of	   whom	   are	   characteristically	   former	   analysts	   for	   intermediaries,	   reporting	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accountants	  or	  lenders.	  They	  may	  also	  be	  company	  directors	  or	  Chief	  Financial	  Officers,	  who	  
have	   previous	   experience	   in	   the	  mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   sector.	  With	   these	   clients,	   the	  
transactions	  are	  simple,	  since	  “we	  understand	  each	  other”,	  “we	  speak	  the	  same	  language”.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	   (and	  as	   in	  art	  worlds),	   they	   find	   it	  a	   lot	  more	  difficult	  and	  even	  dread	  
having	   to	   work	   with	   clients	   who	   could	   be	   classed	   as	   amateurs,	   in	   their	   opinion.	   An	  
archetypal	  example	  is	  the	  boss	  of	  a	  provincial	  SME,	  who	  set	  up	  and	  developed	  his	  business	  
from	  nothing,	  and	  since	  there	  is	  no	  successor,	  is	  trying	  to	  sell	  the	  company.	  With	  these	  sorts	  
of	   people,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   talk	   about	   “value”	   and	   “deals”.	   They	   are	   attached	   to	   their	  
company,	  their	  territory	  and	  their	  employees.	  They	  may	  reject	  a	  takeover	  bid	  because	  they	  
do	  not	   like	   the	  buyer	  or	  because	   the	  buyer	  has	  plans	   to	   completely	  alter	   the	  business,	   in	  
order	   to	  “create	  value”,	  which	   is	  not	   to	   their	   liking.	  These	  bosses	  may	  even	  have	  another	  
definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  value	  of	   their	  company,	  which	  differs	   from	  the	  financial	  
“value”.	  
The	  social	  space	  is	  formed	  by	  M&A	  intermediaries	  and	  those	  upon	  whom	  the	  dissemination	  
of	  the	  systems	  for	  measuring	  “value”	  have	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  (Chief	  Financial	  Officers,	  
auditors,	  business	  lawyers,	  etc.).	  This	  space	  therefore	  shapes	  the	  area	  in	  which	  the	  “value”	  
of	   transactions	   can	  be	  performed.	  Outside	   this	   area,	   the	   value	   is	   indefinite	   and	   therefore	  
does	  not	  form	  a	  market	  per	  se.	  
	  
Conclusion:	  
This	  analysis	  of	  the	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  market	  in	  France	  reveals	  that	  this	  market	  could	  
not	   exist	   without	   cognitive,	   normative	   and	   metrological	   tools.	   Using	   these	   tools,	   the	  
category	   of	   “value	   for	   the	   shareholder”	   can	   be	   created	   and	   legitimised,	   as	   well	   as	   being	  
foregrounded	  through	  appropriate	  measures.	  They	  also	  establish	  a	  group	  whose	  expert	  use	  
of	   these	   tools	   becomes	   their	   professional	   art.	   What	   is	   more,	   by	   situating	   themselves	   as	  
intermediaries	  in	  this	  market,	  they	  play	  a	  part	  in	  creating	  the	  market,	  through	  animating	  it	  
from	  within.	  These	  results	  confirm	  what	  sociology	  can	  contribute	  towards	  a	  critical	  analysis	  
of	  markets.	  
	  
Given	   these	   results,	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   to	   draw	   up	   conjectures	   in	   order	   to	   understand	  
financialization,	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  financial	  means	  of	  understanding	  and	  acting	  on	  the	  
economy.	   Handling	   the	   M&A	   market	   relies	   on	   measurement	   systems,	   as	   tools	   for	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quantifying	  and	  performing	  calculations,	  which	  cannot	  be	  broken	  down	   into	   their	  physical	  
and	  technical	  attributes.	  They	  are	  collective,	  cognitive	  frameworks	  that	  are	  conventions	  for	  
co-­‐ordinating	   actions.	   But	   they	   also	   apply	   categories	   for	   understanding	   the	   company	  as	   a	  
commodity,	   hence	   making	   it	   possible	   to	   create	   capital	   value,	   through	   optimising	   various	  
parameters	   that	   can	   be	   mathematically	   modelled.	   As	   they	   are	   endorsed,	   used	   and	  
disseminated,	   these	   systems	   spread	   the	   financial	   Logos	   within	   ever	   growing	   circles.	   This	  
process	   of	   spreading	   is	   not	   only	   ideological,	   but	   also	   practical,	   in	   that	   implementing	   the	  
systems	  produces	  what	  they	  express,	  that	  is	  “value	  creation”.	  
Nevertheless,	  while	   this	   performativity	   is	   key	   to	   understanding	   the	   dynamics,	   this	   is	   only	  
valid	   for	   short	  periods	  of	   time.	  Although	   the	  systems	  provide	   transactions	  and	  companies	  
with	   a	   “value”,	   it	  may	  be	   that	   over	   time	   this	   “value”	   turns	  out	   to	  not	  be	   in	   line	  with	   the	  
conjectures	  of	  the	  model,	  if	  some	  groups	  focus,	  using	  their	  own	  measurement	  systems,	  on	  
measuring	  this	  difference	  between	  the	  values.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  material	  for	  a	  new	  market.	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